Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scenes a Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works by Murray, Michael D
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles Law Faculty Publications 
2006 
Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scenes a Faire and 
Merger Doctrines for Visual Works 
Michael D. Murray 
University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law, michael.murray1@uky.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Repository Citation 
Murray, Michael D., "Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scenes a Faire and Merger Doctrines for 
Visual Works" (2006). Law Faculty Scholarly Articles. 665. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/665 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more 
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scenes a Faire and Merger Doctrines for 
Visual Works 
Notes/Citation Information 
Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scenes a Faire and Merger Doctrines for 
Visual Works, 58(3) Baylor L. Rev. 779-860 (2006). 
This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/665 
COPYRIGHT, ORIGINALITY, AND THE END OF THE SCANES A FAIRE AND
MERGER DOCTRINES FOR VISUAL WORKS
Michael D. Murray*
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 781
II. THE MERGER DOCTRINE AND SCANESA4 FAIRE DOCTRINE ...... 784
A. Originality in Copyright .................................................. 784
B. The Scope of Protection for Ideas Versus Expressions ...786
C. Doctrines of Limitation Based on Originality: Merger
and Scenes A Faire ........................................................... 788
III. EFFECTS OF THE EXPANDING APPLICATION OF THE MERGER
AND SCaNES 4 FAIRE DOCTRINES TO VISUAL WORKS ............. 798
A. Circuits With an Expansive View of the Application of
the Merger and Scenes A Faire Doctrines to Visual
W orks ............................................................................... 799
1. F irst C ircuit ................................................................ 799
2. N inth C ircuit .............................................................. 803
3. Fifth C ircuit ................................................................ 812
4. Sixth C ircuit ............................................................... 814
5. Tenth C ircuit .............................................................. 819
6. Eleventh Circuit ......................................................... 821
7. Federal C ircuit ........................................................... 823
B. Circuits Restricting the Application of the Merger and
Scenes A Faire Doctrines in the Visual Media Context.. .824
University of Illinois College of Law (Illinois). Professor Murray is a co-author of THE
DESKBOOK OF ART LAW (Oxford University Press, Oceana Division 2004, 2005, 2006) and ART
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (William S. Hein 2004). Many of Professor Murray's colleagues
have supported him in the creation of this Article through their comments, input, advice, and
general encouragement. Professor Murray thanks Professors Jane Ginsburg (Columbia Law
School), Tom Ginsburg (Illinois), Craig Joyce (University of Houston Law Center), Richard
Kaplan (Illinois), Jay Kesan (Illinois), Mark Lemley (Stanford Law School), Peter Maggs
(Illinois), Tyler Ochoa (Santa Clara University School of Law), and Larry Solum (Illinois) for
these things. He especially thanks Samantha Bell, Michelle Chen, Sara Arroyo, Anna Downs-
Temple, Steve Monde, Megan Segura, and Tobiah Utter for their able research, and Mary Parsons
for her on-going support.
BA YLOR LAW REVIEW
1. Second C ircuit ............................................................ 824
2. Third C ircuit ............................................................... 830
3. Fourth C ircuit ............................................................. 836
4. Seventh C ircuit ........................................................... 838
5. E ighth C ircuit ............................................................. 844
6. District of Columbia Circuit ...................................... 845
IV. REJECTION OF THE MERGER DOCTRINE AND SCANES A FAIRE
DOCTRINE FOR VISUAL WORKS .............................................. 848
A. Allegations of Literal or Actual Copying Defeat the
Need for the Application of the Merger and Scenes A
Faire D octrines ................................................................ 850
B. Judges Reveal an Ignorance of Creative, Original
Artistic Combinations and Additions to Works
Through an Expansive Application of the Merger and
Scenes A Faire D octrines ................................................. 853
C. An Expansive Application of the Merger and Scenes A
Faire Doctrines Denies Visual Artists the Protection of
the Copyright Laws by Taking the Substantial
Similarity Determination Away From the Finder of
F act .................................................................................. 855
VI. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOLUTION'? ............. 857
A. Solution: Eliminate the Application of the Merger and
Scenes i Faire Doctrines to Visual Works ...................... 858
B. Recommendation: Impose a Burden on the Alleged
Plagiarist to Produce the Image Copied by the
Original Artist in Order to Trigger the Application of
the Merger and Scenes A Faire Doctrines to Visual
W orks ............................................................................... 858
C. Recommendation: Allow the Finder of Fact to
Evaluate the Total Look and Feel of the Two
Competing Visual Works, but Impose a Check on the
Process with Sspecial Verdict Forms .............................. 859
[Vol. 58:3
THE END OF SCINES A FAIRE AND MERGER
I. INTRODUCTION
Compare two works, one of which is alleged to be a copy of the other.
The first is the Mona Lisa by Leonardo da Vinci.' The second is another
portrait of a woman with long, dark hair sitting in a window overlooking a
somewhat dramatic landscape of twisting roads and bending rivers. A
determination must be made as to whether the second work is an
infringement of the Mona Lisa.2 There is no direct evidence of copying;
therefore, the two works must be compared for substantial similarity.
3
Consideration now must be given to the merger doctrine in the area of
copyrights which states that if an idea and the expression of the idea are so
tied together that the idea and its expression are one-there is only one
conceivable way to express and embody the idea in a work-then the
expression of the idea is not copyrightable because ideas may not be
copyrighted.4 The sc~nes dfaire doctrine complements the merger doctrine
'Portrait of Mona Lisa (1503-06), also known as La Gioconda, the wife of Francesco del
Giocondo, oil on wood, 77 x 53 cm, Musee du Louvre, Paris, France, available at
http://www.harley.com/art/abstract-art/images/(davinci)-mona-lisa.jpg (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
2This will require a little imagination because the Mona Lisa is most definitely in the public
domain, but this example depends on the Mona Lisa being protected by copyright.
3 In the absence of direct proof of actual copying, which is to say in the majority of copyright
infringement cases, a court must make a determination of whether or not the defendant copied
using a two part test: (1) whether the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work, and (2) whether
the works are similar enough to suggest that it is likely that the defendant copied the plaintiff's
work. See MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng'g Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1554 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Rogers
v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992). If there is sufficient proof of access and probative
similarity to suggest copying, then the court compares the two works for substantial similarity to
determine whether the defendant's copying of the plaintiffs work constitutes infringement. See
MiTek, 89 F.3d at 1554; Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307-08. "Striking similarity" between the works is
held to be conclusive proof of copying even in the absence of proof of access. Positive Black Talk
Inc. v. Cash Money Records Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 371 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2004); Repp v. Webber, 132
F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997). But even overwhelming proof of access does not take the place of
evidence of probative similarity to infer copying. See Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d at 371 &
n.10.
4See, e.g., Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986). There is a
great deal of scholarship discussing the merger doctrine. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, What's Different
about Intellectual Property?, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, What's
Different]; Jane C. Ginsburg, "The Exclusive Right to Their Writings ": Copyright and Control in
the Digital Age, 54 ME. L. REV. 195, 210 & n.91 (2002); Scott Abrahamson, Comment, Seen
One, Seen Them All? Making Sense of the Copyright Merger Doctrine, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1125
(1998); Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1,
9-10 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Convergence]; L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing
2006]
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by providing that certain subject matter-stock images, tried and true story
lines, fables and folklore, scenes of nature, common visual and cultural
references, all of which fall under the title of "scenes that must be done"--
are not able to be copyrighted because they are part of the public domain
and no one can obtain a monopoly on such images by putting them into a
fixed and tangible medium of expression. As a result, in many
jurisdictions, if the first work embodies any images that are scones d faire
or subject to the merger doctrine, one is required to cancel them out before
considering whether the second work infringes on the first. In other words,
the second work must have elements that are substantially similar to the
protected elements of the first work, not the first work as a whole.
In our example, certainly the fact that the subject of the. portrait is a
woman must be canceled out because da Vinci can claim no monopoly on
this subject matter. The long dark hair is common to many women; we
must disregard it. The coy, shy (or is it knowing, mysterious, or inviting)
expression on the woman's face must also be disregarded; facial
expressions are natural images, not subject to capture and monopolization
by any artist. Her posture is a natural image. Posing a sitter in a window
overlooking a landscape of twisting roads and bending rivers surely is a
stock image in portraiture-perhaps one that incorporates a scene from a
fable or fairy tale that da Vinci cannot claim for his own. The simple frock
she wears is not of intricate design and ornamentation-features that da
Vinci might have claimed were products of his creative fancy and thus
substantially original and protected. As it is, her attire fails to reveal
creative elements and largely must be ignored. Lastly, the colors chosen by
da Vinci for the work must be ignored; colors are in the public domain.6 At
the end of this reductionist dissection process, there is little or no protected
element to compare to the second work. Therefore, even if the second work
the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36
UCLA L. REV. 719 (1989).
5 See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.
1982), superseded by rule in part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v.
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980); Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scdnes 6 Faire Doctrine, 41
FLA. L. REV. 79 (1989) [hereinafter Kurtz]; see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the
Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REv. 215, 219 & n.24, 254 (2002) [hereinafter Ochoa, Public
Domain] (considering that patent law requires novelty, indispensable expressions are part of the
public domain); Lemley, What's Different, supra note 4, at 1102; Lemley, Convergence, supra
note 4, at 11.
6 Ochoa, Public Domain, supra note 5, at 219.
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is manifestly similar in appearance to the work, da Vinci has so few
protected elements in his work that no reasonable finder of fact could
determine that the second work is substantially similar to the Mona Lisa.
The court must grant summary judgment in favor of the artist of the second
work.
Consider one additional example that moves us forward several
centuries: Grant Wood's American Gothic.7  A second work looks
suspiciously similar to Wood's masterpiece of Americana. But in many
jurisdictions the merger and scones dfaire doctrine require one to filter out
any unprotectable elements. Surely, the posing of a man and his daughter
together must be disregarded. Such is the very nature of scones d faire-a
scene that must be done-and an artist wishing to paint a father and
daughter side-by-side is common. The viewer must disregard the stem,
almost comically morose expressions on the subjects' faces. Facial
expressions are natural images, and Wood has no monopoly on stem-faced
subjects. The posing in front of their home recreates a stock American
image and, thus, must be disregarded. The fact that they are farmers and
are dressed in classic "Sunday Best" attire (for farmers) is an image from
the public domain for which Wood cannot claim credit.8 Farmers hold
pitchforks, so forget the pitchfork. This kind of clich& must certainly be
subject to the scones d faire doctrine if not the merger doctrine. The
architecture of the house (the quasi-Gothic design to the window of the
house) in the background may be unique enough in design to allow Wood
to claim protection for it. Thus, the only elements to compare are some of
the ornamentation on the subjects, the brooch worn by the woman, the exact
style of eyewear worn by the man, and the unique architecture of the
building in the background. Perhaps Wood included too few protected
elements to enable him to proceed with a copyright infringement claim, and
the court may grant summary judgment for the artist of the second work
before even considering the second work.
Such is the state of the copyright law in many parts of the United
States. 9 Although the courts have from time to time acknowledged that the
standards for originality and creativity required for copyright are
7American Gothic (1930), oil on beaverboard, 74.3 x 62.4 cm, Art Institute of Chicago,
Chicago, Ill., available at http://www.artic.edu/artaccess/AAModem/pages/MOD_5_lg.shtml
(last visited Apr. 5, 2006) or http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4748148 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2006).
8 Ochoa, Public Domain, supra note 5, at 219.
9 See Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng'g Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11 th Cir. 1996).
2006]
BAYLOR LAWREVIEW
intentionally low-and that there are myriad ways to express themes and
ideas visually-half of the circuits of the United States courts of appeals
have applied the kind of "reductionist," dissection approach described in the
two examples above in their consideration of infringement of visual works
that is driven by an expanded view of the applicability of the merger and
scones dfaire doctrines to visual works.'0
This Article will first argue that the merger doctrine and scones d faire
doctrine are perfectly well adapted to verbal and literary works, but have no
meaning and no proper application with regard to visual works and should
be discarded in the consideration of infringement of visual works. Part II
will describe the merger doctrine and scones t faire doctrine that fall under
the requirement of originality in the United States copyright law and
explain the proper application of the doctrines to verbal and literary works.
Part III will describe the current state of the law in which half of the circuits
of the United States courts of appeals feel compelled by the existence of the
merger and scones dtfaire doctrines to engage in filtering and dissection and
other reductionist approaches to the elements of visual works when
evaluating substantial similarity in infringement cases. Finally, Part IV will
complete the argument for a rejection of the merger and scones d faire
doctrines for visual works.
II. THE MERGER DOCTRINE AND SCANES 4 FAIRE DOCTRINE
A. Originality in Copyright
The discussion of originality in copyright law begins with one axiomatic
proposition: There can be no valid copyright in facts." No author may
copyright his ideas12 or the facts he narrates. 13 The key to understanding the
'old.; Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).
11Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). The Feist case and
the originality requirements defined therein are discussed in Tyler T. Ochoa, 1984 and Beyond:
Two Decades of Copyright Law, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 167, 169-70
(2003); Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of
Originality in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 949 (2002); Jane C. Ginsburg,
Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller, & William F. Patry, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term
Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 660-63 (2000); Jane C.
Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information after Feist v.
Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 338, 367-87 (1992).
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
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merger and scones cd faire doctrines lies in understanding why facts are not
copyrightable.
In Feist, the Supreme Court explained the meaning of a copyright:
The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author.
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that
the work was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses
at least some minimal degree of creativity .... To be sure,
the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a
slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative
spark, "no matter how crude, humble or obvious" it might
be.
14
Originality is not the same thing as novelty. 15 A work may be original
even if it closely resembles another work or several different works. 16 The
single requirement of originality is that any similarity between the new
work and older works must be accidental and fortuitous; the product of
random, independent creation. 17 The similarity must not be the result of
copying. 18 Thus, the copyright requirement of originality amounts to little
more than a prohibition on actual copying. 19
Alternatively, no one may claim originality as to the reporting and
publication of facts.20 Facts, data, and information about the world do not
1
3 Feist, 499 U.S. at 344-45; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
556 (1985).
1
4 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][1] (1990)); see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547-49; 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Goldstein]; 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01 [A], [B] (2005) [hereinafter Nimmer].
5 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.2.1.
16 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.2.1.
17See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
"See id.
'9See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-46; The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (holding
originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity); Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.).




owe their origin to an act of authorship. 2' The first person to find and report
a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its
existence.22 Facts are not original to an author who writes about those facts.
"[A]Il facts-scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day"--
23belong to the public domain and are available to every person.
Nevertheless, while others may copy the underlying facts and ideas
from a publication, they may not copy the exact words or arrangement used
to present them.24 For example, the facts of a president's life are subject to
copying and republication but not his exact words and phrases regarding
public figures and public events written in an autobiography.25 The artist or
author's creative expression and embodiment of the idea is protected.26
Copyright assures authors the right to control their original expression, but
encourages others to borrow the underlying ideas and themes used by the
original author and create their own original expression.27 This principle,
known as the idea-expression dichotomy, applies to all works of
authorship.28
B. The Scope of Protection for Ideas Versus Expressions
The definition of an "idea" in a literary work often is the most difficult
aspect of the idea-expression dichotomy.29  Judge Learned Hand
characterized the difficulty in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. as arising
from the fact that an idea, as opposed to the expression of the idea in
literature, can be manipulated by viewing the interest protected by
copyright at differing levels of abstraction.30 If protection is limited to the
words as they appear on the page-a strictly literal application of the term
"expression"-the protection for original "Writings" envisioned by the
21Feist, 499 U.S. at 347; Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.2.1.
22 Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
21Feist, 499 U.S. at 347; Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir.
1981); Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.2.1.
24See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
25Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57, 563 (1985).
261d.; Feist, 499 U.S. at 348-49.
27Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556-57.
21Feist, 499 U.S. at 350; see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556-57. See generally Goldstein,
supra note 14, § 2.3.
29See Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.3.1.1; Nimmer, supra note 14, § 1.10[B][2].
3045 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir.
1990) (discussing Nichols).
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Constitution3' would be considerably thin.32 A new author could imitate the
plot, character types, exposition, conflict, resolution, and all other original
elements of a novel so long as she changed the wording.33 Buz if protection
extends to the full range of derivative works that might be expressed by the
author arising from the author's fleshing out of an "idea" in literature, then
an author could claim property rights to an entire genre.34 This would mean
that Edgar Allan Poe or Wilkie Collins could have captured the mystery
genre with the publication of a single mystery story; the innovators of the
first reality television show, Survivor, might have deprived the public of
The Amazing Race, Fear Factor, Big Brother, or even Temptation Island.35
This difficulty is not present in visual works because there are myriad
possible ways to express ideas visually; 36 a new author need only refrain
from copying one. A perfect example of the idea-expression dichotomy in
visual works is the case of photography. Photography takes as its subject
the concrete objects (the facts) of the world around us, and yet for over a
hundred and twenty years the Supreme Court has recognized that works of
photography are sufficiently creative and original as to obtain the protection
of copyright. 37 This is true for staged and posed subjects of photographs, as
well as for advertising and for more natural or random snap-shots.38 What
31U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8.
32 Nimmer, supra note 14, § 1. 10[B][2]; see Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.3.1.2 (stating that
when idea and expression are inseparable, protecting the expression would confer a monopoly of
the idea).
33See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
34Nimmer, supra note 14, §§ 1.10[B][2], [C][2]; see also Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.3.2.
35 Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 291 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Roth, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 336 (2005); Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540.
36Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
there are innumerable ways of depicting doll faces); Southco, 390 F.3d at 292 (Roth, J.
dissenting) (stating that Southco's numbering rules and the resulting numbers are one of many
possible expressions of the idea of using a code to convey product specifications); Atari Games
Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Atari I1] (Ginsburg, J.) (holding
that there are innumerable ways of depicting breakout game features), appeal after remand from
888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Atari I] (Ginsburg, J.).
37See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1884); Leigh v. Warner
Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2000). Yet, there are dissenting voices regarding
the recognition of photography as a creative, original, copyrightable media. See generally
Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's Response to the Invention of
Photography, 65 U. PiTT. L. REv. 385, 446-51 (2004) (criticizing the conception of the authorship
used for photographs).
38See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); Burrows-Giles
2006]
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the author of a photographic work brings to the creativity and originality
equation is an artist's sense of composition, angle, exposure, F-stop and
aperture settings, background, lighting, and the creation of certain elements
of the scene.39 In Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., the Southern District of
New York categorized photographic originality into three specific areas:
rendition of the photograph (angle, light, shade, exposure, filter effects,
developing techniques, or composition), the timing of the photograph (how
it fortuitously or consciously captures the moment when the expression
associated with the subject matter is the most poignant), and the creation of
the subject matter of the photograph (i.e. when the photographer stages or
creates original subject matter for photographing).40 However, nothing in
these original elements prevents another author from photographing,
painting, writing about, or otherwise using the same subject matter (the
facts) in their own original expression as long as they do not copy the first
author's expression.4'
C. Doctrines of Limitation Based on Originality: Merger and ScOnes
d Faire
Copyright protection is subject to an important limitation: "The mere
fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the
work may be protected. 'A2  The requirement of originality means that
copyright protection extends only to those components of a work that are
original to the author.43
The merger doctrine is a variation or application of the idea-expression
dichotomy. When the idea and the expression of the idea are inseparable,
then the expression will not be copyrightable because it would necessarily
give the author a monopoly on the expression of the underlying idea.44 In
other words, if there is only one way to express or depict an idea then no
Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 60; Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003);
Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1215; Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992).
39Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250; Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir.
2000); Los Angeles News Serv., 973 F.2d at 794 (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d
448, 452 (9th Cir. 1978)).
4o377 F. Supp. 2d 444,452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
41See id. at 454; Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082; Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d
135, 138 (5th Cir. 1992).
42 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
43id.
44 Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986).
(Vol. 58:3
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one may claim a copyright in that single manner of expression or depiction
because that would evict everyone else from the right to express or depict
that idea.45
The merger doctrine is traced to Learned Hand's opinion in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., which links the principles underlying the merger
doctrine to those underlying the scones d faire doctrine, although neither
doctrine is named in the opinion.46 The Nichols case involved two literary
works (a stage play and a screenplay) alleged to be substantially similar.47
There was no allegation that actual scenes or actual text was copied from
the first work into the second, but Judge Hand observed that: "It is of
course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at common-
law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text,
else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. ' 48 The first work
involved a Jewish widower whose son secretly married an Irish Catholic
girl whose widower father opposed the union as did the Jewish father.49
Eventually, the two fathers reconcile in order to rejoin the company of their
respective children and grandchildren.50  The second work involved a
Jewish family who lived in a state of animosity with their neighbors, an
Irish Catholic family.51 The plot centered around the quarrelling of the two
families: the fathers fought, the mothers bickered, and even the children
and pets clashed.5 2 The only family members not engaged in the squabble
were the Jewish daughter and the Irish son, who, as you may have guessed,
secretly married.5 3 Further conflict is introduced when the Jewish father
inherits a sizeable sum of money, but later learns that the proper legatee is
the Irish father, and by turning over the money, he prompts an unlikely
friendship and partnership between the two fathers.54
Judge Hand noted the difficulty in applying the merger doctrine:
4 5See Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.3.2.
4645 F.2d 119, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1930).
471d. at 120.
4 Ild. at 121.
49Id. at 120.
50ld. at 120-22.





[W]hen the plagiarist does not take out a block in situ [sic],
but an abstract of the whole, decision is more troublesome.
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number
of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as
more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of
what the play is about, and at times might consist only of
its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions
where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the
playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and
nobody ever can.55
The opinion declared that stealing lines or scenes or stealing specific
characters from a work may be actionable if it is a substantial taking. 6 The
court reasoned that the comparison of the similarity between two plots and
storylines requires examination at the lowest level of abstraction that it
takes to find the two works are the same; if the works are only similar at a
high level of abstraction, it will be less likely that their similarity will
constitute actionable infringement.57 For example, the two works at issue in
Nichols may be abstracted as follows (starting with a high level of
abstraction and working downward):
two works about two men with children;
two works about two men whose children marry;
two works about two men whose children marry causing the men
grief and anger;
two works about two men whose children marry in secret causing
the men grief and anger;
two works about two men from different religions whose children
marry in secret causing the men grief and anger because of their
religious differences;
two works about two men from different religions whose children
marry in secret, causing the men grief and anger because of their
religious differences, but who reconcile in the end;
55 Id. (citation omitted).
56Id.
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two works about a Jewish man and an Irish Catholic man whose
children marry in secret, causing them grief and anger because of their
religious differences, but who reconcile in the end;
and so on.
If the level of abstraction at which the works share the most similarities
mainly involves the level of ideas (e.g., the idea of pig-headed men who
cannot get along because of religious differences; the idea of men who
overcome petty religious differences in favor of stronger values), or
generalities (e.g., problems of marriages of two people from different
religions; the situation of marriages that cause animosity in families but
later produce a kind of coexistence), or repeats plot devices and stock
themes common to many works (e.g., star-crossed lovers; feuding families
brought together by a marriage of defectors; fathers who compromise
because of love of children or grandchildren), then the works are similar at
a level where the first author cannot claim protection. The abstraction of
two literary works for comparison of the plot and storyline must not result
in a pattern of similarity that eliminated so many disparate details of the
works that the remaining similarities are simply plot ideas, stock themes, or
common character types interacting in predictable ways. 58 This is the level
of abstraction where Judge Hand found the two works in Nichols, and he
rejected the claim for infringement.59
The process of abstraction and comparison described in Nichols works
well in literary pieces where individual authors, all using a common
language (English), may discuss a common theme, plot device, or
character-type or may flesh out a familiar scene or stock image. In such
instances, all literary works will share commonalities if they share a
common idea but not elements that are original to one author. The idea and
the expression of the idea will merge in a literary sense as the idea itself
captures the several words and phrases necessary to communicate the idea
in writing. Judge Hand recognized that it is prudent to declare such plot
ideas, character-types, familiar scenes, and stock images as part of the
public domain, available to all authors who wish to embody the idea or
scene in their own work.60 Thus, his decision is the grandfather of both the
merger doctrine and the scones dfaire doctrine.
58 1d. at 120-21.
5 9 1d. at 121-22.
60 See id.
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In the last two decades, the merger doctrine has seen the greatest
increase in its application in cases concerning the copyrightability of
computer programs. Computer programs are both literary (the source code
and object code)6' and functional.62 Sometimes computer programs also
produce visual results. The argument was raised and accepted in many
computer code copyright cases that within a given programming language,
certain results (the ideas) cannot be achieved without using certain
expressions (source code).63 Thus, a merger of idea and expression was
found and sequences of source code were declared to be uncopyrightable to
avoid giving an early programmer a monopoly over a number of results in
the context of the use of a certain programming language. 64
The merger doctrine is inapplicable when the same idea can be
65expressed in a plurality of different manners. In these situations each
author's creative original expression of the idea deserves copyright
protection.66
A perfect example of how courts misinterpret the merger doctrine in
connection with visual works is the Ninth Circuit case of Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian.67 In Kalpakian, the court determined that there
was only one way for the idea of a jeweled pin in the shape of a bee to
effectively be depicted.68 As a result, the court ruled that the defendant
could copy a plaintiff's depiction of a jeweled bee pin because the
plaintiffs depiction was the only possible effective depiction, and the
plaintiff cannot claim a copyright monopoly of the only available method of
depicting an idea.69 The idea and the depiction are one, and no one can
copyright an idea .70 Although this is a venerated opinion, cited and
61Nimmer, supra note 14, § 2.04[C]; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of "computer
program").
62Nimmer, supra note 14, § 2.18[J].
63 Id. §§ 2.04[C], 2.18[B], 2.18[J]; see Lemley, Convergence, supra note 4, at 11, 14, 16, 31.
64An outcome that should be precluded by Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1879). See
generally Nimmer, supra note 14, §§ 2.04[C], 2.18[B].
65 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983);
Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.3.2.
66 Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.3.2; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926)
(holding that when a myriad of variations of a scene are possible, a myriad of protectable
copyrights can exist).
67446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
68 See id. at 742.
69
See id. at 740.
70See generally id.
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accepted for decades,7' the opinion is simply wrong. The fallacy of the
opinion is that there is only one effective way to depict a jeweled bee pin.
Nothing limits the creative potential of the designer of a jeweled bee pin
other than the simple notion that the end product should resemble a bee.72
The amount of gold or other metal used and exposed in the design, the size
and shape and number of the gems or semi-precious stones used, the color,
tone, shade, clarity, and brilliance of the gems or stones used, whether the
gems or stones will have few or many or no facets are simply the beginning
of the creative opportunities available to a designer of a jeweled bee pin.73
The plaintiff monopolizes nothing by coming out with one possible design
when there are so many other available designs. In the light of these
creative opportunities, there is no need to allow the defendant to copy
plaintiff's single and original design.
The scones t faire doctrine compliments the merger doctrine when it is
applied to literary works. The scones it faire doctrine provides that when
discussing a certain topic, story-line, or genre, there are certain themes,
scenes, incidents, character types, or settings that, as a practical matter,
must be used to properly treat the topic. 74 A literary discussion of a salmon
run will inevitably describe how they swim for hundreds of miles, fly up
over waterfalls, some being snatched in mid-air by hungry grizzly bears,
and the rest striving to return to the pools where they were spawned.
Motion pictures following the boy-meets-girl, boy-gets-girl, boy-loses-girl,
boy-gets-girl-back storyline inevitably will employ character types of
thoughtless boys and petulant girls, and contain similar scenes of
miscommunication, anger, and reconciliation in their conflict development
and conflict resolution. A discussion of the Three Stooges' or Chris
71E.g., Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.3.2.
72 If the only similarity between the two works was that they both resembled a bee, then the
plaintiff's claim of infringement properly failed. The similarity would have been limited to the
shared concept or idea of the two works, and the idea itself is not copyrightable. If the holding of
Kalpakian were limited to this proposition, the case would be correct. But the opinion goes much
farther by declaring that plaintiff produced the only possible design and depiction of a jeweled bee
inviting every subsequent jeweler to copy plaintiffs bee design without limitation. See Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742.
73The record unfortunately indicates that plaintiffs counsel was not sufficiently
knowledgeable about jewelry when it came to explaining the different design opportunities
available to the defendant. See id. at 740.
74 E.g., Atari Inc., v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.
1982), superseded by rule in part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v.
Euroquilt, Inc 772 F. 2d 1423 (7th Cir. 1985); see Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.3.2.
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Farley's movies will inevitably contain references to "slap-stick," "prat
falls," "physical comedy," and "self-effacing humor." The works
discussing these scenes and themes will use similar language even at a
fairly low level of abstraction because the very idea that is being expressed
requires authors to use certain terminology and phrasing.75 An author's use
of these terms and phrases is not original and cannot impose a monopoly on
the terms and phrases associated with the scene or theme.76
When applied in the context of literary or utilitarian works, the scones d
faire doctrine means that copyright protection is denied to common
elements of work that are essential to the presentation of the subject matter
of the work.77 The rationale for the rule is that elements dictated by subject
matter itself necessarily lack originality.78 Another way of looking at it is
that stock images and themes that are covered under the scones d faire
doctrine are in the public domain, and are thus free to be used by all.79 In a
true scones d faire situation, the plaintiff author is as likely to have drawn
her material from the public domain as the plagiarist is, and it is even more
likely that the alleged plagiarist has not copied plaintiff author's work at all,
but instead drew the material from the public domain.
The scones d faire doctrine has no proper application in the case of
visual works.80 To the extent that the idea of certain images is in the public
domain, they are free for use whether characterized as scones d faire or
simply themes and ideas.8' In the visual work context, all themes and ideas
(mundane ideas and clever ideas, stock images and innovative images,
scenes that must be done and those that are more optional) are proper
subjects for works as long as the author does not copy the expression of
75See Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.3.2.
76
ld.
77Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 214-15
(3d Cir. 2002); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1375 (10th Cir. 1997). See generally
Kurtz, supra note 5, at 90-96; Goldstein, supra note 14, § 2.3.2.
78 Dun & Bradstreet, 307 F.3d at 214-15; Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1375.
79See Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (7th Cir. 2005);
Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2004); Murray Hill Publ'ns, Inc. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 2004); Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc.
v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2003); Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co. v.
Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2000).
80See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Becker,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 336 (2005).
" See Murray Hill Publ'ns, 361 F.3d at 319.
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another copyrighted visual work.82 In other words, there is no single visual
expression of stock theme or commonplace idea that must be copied in
order for the "scene" to be "done" properly. That is why many courts have
recognized that scones di faire is a doctrine that applies to literary or
dramatic works.83 It does not fit with visual works.
The idea of a soup can as the subject of a painting is in the public
domain, but Andy Warhol's embodiment of that idea in the form of a
Warhol painting of a Campbell's soup can is not in the public domain.84 No
artist wishing to embody the idea of a soup can in their work needs to copy
Warhol's embodiment of that idea. They are free to paint all the soup cans
they want (in a copyright sense, without regard to the limitations of other
areas of the law, such as trademark, unfair competition, and false
designation of origin laws) as long as they do not copy Warhol's
embodiment of the idea. Jeff Koons can paint or sculpt a work embodying
the idea of two people holding a string of puppies in their laps; he just
cannot copy Art Roger's embodiment of that idea in the form of an Art
Roger photograph.
The difficulties in applying the idea-expression dichotomy in
photography in light of the lurking presence of the merger and scones 6
faire doctrines is revealed by comparing two cases from the federal trial
court of the Southern District of New York, Mannion v. Coors Brewing
Co.86 and Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency, Inc.8 7 In Mannion, the
court considered a photograph of basketball star Kevin Garnett who was
depicted wearing a considerable assortment of men's jewelry. 88 A similar
photograph appeared as part of a Coors billboard advertisement, where the
allegedly plagiarized photograph zeroed in on the hands and mid-section of
the model.89 Similarities were noted in the heavily veined hands of the
1
2 See Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 1996).
83 Southco, 390 F.3d at 287 (Becker, J., concurring); Lexmark Int'l., Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 387 F,3d 522, 535 (6th Cir. 2004); Murray Hill Publ'ns, 361 F.3d at 319-20;
Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002); Sheen, 77 F.3d at 1286.
84 Assuming no lapse in the registration, renewal, and protection for works created prior to
1979, the copyright should last at least until 70 years after Warhol's death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)
(2000).
85See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1992).
86377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
87133 F. Supp. 2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
88377 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (referring to it as "bling bling").
89 1d. at 448.
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model in both photographs, the same white athletic attire, and the same
number, type, assortment, and placement of the items of jewelry worn by
the model, although the composition of the allegedly infringing work was a
mirror image of the original. 90 Coors and its ad agency defended the
allegations by asserting that plaintiffs photograph was not protectable: It
was a rendition of an unprotectable idea-a heavily bejeweled African-
American man-and any alleged similarities between the two works were
attributable to the fact that both photographers had chosen to depict the
same subject matter.9' Subject matter from the real world is fact, and the
idea of depicting such subject matter in a photograph is an idea, and ideas
and facts are not copyrightable.
The Mannion court rejected these assertions in their entirety.92 The
court noted that photographs are readily copyrightable, and the creative,
original elements are found in the photographer's rendition of the
photograph, the timing of the photograph, or the creation of the subject
matter of the photograph. 93 The court noted the originality of plaintiffs
creation and the rendition of the subject matter and the substantial similarity
between defendants' depiction and plaintiff S94 and denied defendants'
summary judgment motion.
95
In Kaplan, the court declared that the second of two photographs, each
depicting a person in businessman's attire staring down at his feet which
dangle over the edge of a tall building as if he is contemplating a leap from
the edge (i.e., a photograph of a potential executive jumper taken from the
jumper's perspective) could not be held to infringe the first photograph.
96
The court reasoned that the general similarity between the two works was
attributed to the two photographers' choices to depict the same subject
matter, and any direct similarities between the actual photographs was
9°See id. and Images 1 and 2 attached to the opinion.
91 d. at 452, 455-56, 462.
92 1d. at 462-63.
93
1d. at 452-53.
94 Id. at 456 ("The 'idea' (if one wants to call it that) [of the photograph] postulated by the
defendants does not even come close to accounting for all the similarities between the two works,
which extend at least to angle, pose, background, composition, and lighting. It is possible to
imagine any number of depictions of a black man wearing a white T-shirt and 'bling bling' that
look nothing like either of the photographs at issue here.").
9Id. at 462-63.
96 See Kaplan v. Stock Mkt. Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317, 323-26 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
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necessitated by the common scene and subject matter of the photographs.97
If that were the extent of the discussion, the case would gel nicely with
Mannion, but the court goes on to state that "[i]t would be impossible to
depict the photograph's subject matter without portraying [the subject] in
[the] pose" selected by the original photographer. 98  Then, the court
incongruously identifies several aspects of the two photographers' rendition
or staging of the photograph that were freely open to artistic creativity: the
point of view of the photograph (bird's eye, over the shoulder, frontal,
below from a far angle, below from a direct upward angle, or from the
jumper's point of view), the cropping of the photograph (close up, medium,
wide angle), the angle of the jumper's perspective (e.g., whether it took in a
snippet of pin-striped pants legs or a knee to shoe length of pin-striped
pants legs), the shading of the street below in the one photograph and the
inclusion of a second building closely abutting the opposite side of the
street in the other photograph. 99 With respect to the point of view, the court
even admits: "There may be, as [plaintiff] Kaplan suggests, many other
angles from which to depict the scene .. ,100 Nevertheless, the court
believed that each artistic decision of the original photographer was dictated
by the merger of the subject matter with the depiction and any specific
elements of the depiction not merged with the idea of the subject matter
were scones tifaire of the scene depicted.0 1
The Mannion court rejected the application of the merger and scones 6
faire doctrines to visual works because it held that the idea-expression
distinction should be severely limited in cases involving visual works, while
in Kaplan the court placed no such limitation on their application to visual
works.102 Mannion discussed the abstraction analysis of Nichols and the
concept of the "line" that must be drawn where the second work takes too
much protected original expression because it encompasses too specific an
abstraction of the first work. 0 3 Mannion stated that with respect to visual
media, such as photography:






'0 I1d. at 323, 324 & n.10, 325.
1
02 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Kaplan,
133 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24 (applying scenes dfaire doctrine to visual works).
103 Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 457.
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[T]he line itself is meaningless because the conceptual
categories it purports to delineate are ill-suited to the
subject matter ....
The idea/expression distinction arose in the context of
literary copyright. For the most part, the Supreme Court
has not applied it outside that context ....
In the visual arts, the distinction breaks down ....
"[O]ne cannot divide a visual work into neat layers of
abstraction in precisely the same manner one could with a
text...
' [L]ittle is gained by attempting to distinguish an
unprotectible [sic] "idea" from its protectible [sic]
"expression" in a photograph or other work of visual art
... The idea/expression distinction in photography, and
probably the other visual arts, thus achieves nothing...
... [and] is not useful or relevant. 104
The Mannion opinion preserves the creative original components of
photography and original combinations of unprotectable components that
are meant to be protected under the holdings of Feist and Sarony.10 5 It
accomplishes this by limiting the application of the idea-expression
distinction in cases involving visual works and rejecting the expansive
application of the merger and scones 6faire doctrines to visual works.
III. EFFECTS OF THE EXPANDING APPLICATION OF THE MERGER AND
SCANES4 FAIRE DOCTRINES TO VISUAL WORKS
Sadly, the courts have not been content to limit the application of the
merger and scones dfaire doctrines to literary or dramatic settings. Instead,
courts have applied these doctrines to claims of infringement of visual
works wherein the elements of visual works that are claimed to be
unprotected under these doctrines are filtered out and purposefully ignored
'4Id. at 458-59,461 (quoting Jon 0. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The
Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691,698
(1999)) (footnotes omitted).
l05Id. at 461-62; Sarony v. Ehrich 28 F. 79, 80 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). See generally Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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when comparing a competing work against the original in a test of
substantial similarity.'0 6  The result in far too many cases is that visual
works are reduced down to nothing, which further results in the award of
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law for the defendant before
the finder of fact even gets a chance to make an intrinsic evaluation of the
substantial similarity of the two works.1
0 7
This section presents the law of each circuit regarding the merger
doctrine and scines 6 faire doctrine in evaluating substantial similarity of
two visual works. I will present the circuits favoring an expansive
interpretation of the two doctrines first, followed by the circuits that have a
more a circumscribed approach to the application of the merger and scones
dfaire doctrines to visual works. In one instance, I will present the circuits
out of order for the reason that the Ninth Circuit's jurisprudence on the
issue reveals the problem I am analyzing in the starkest focus.
A. Circuits With an Expansive View of the Application of the Merger
and Scenes t Faire Doctrines to Visual Works
1. First Circuit
The First Circuit presents a relevant starting point for this discussion. In
Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 108 the First Circuit affirmed
and endorsed the substantial similarity test applied by the lower court, the
District of Massachusetts.10 9 The case involved the comparison of pictorial
labels for scented candles." 0 The District of Massachusetts applied the
106 The most common formulation of the test is called the abstraction-filtration-comparison
test, which is traced to Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., where the court
applied the abstraction-filtration-comparison test in the evaluation of similarity of merged and
scones tifaire elements of computer programs. 982 F.2d 693, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1992).
1
07E.g., Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F. 3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001).
'°91d. at 32. The prevailing law on substantial similarity is to subject the work to two tests:
an extrinsic similarity test (sometimes called probative similarity test) in which the ideas behind
the two works and expressions of those ideas are evaluated for evidence of probable copying, and
an intrinsic similarity test (sometimes called substantial similarity test) in which a non-expert,
ordinary observer is to determine the extent or substantiality of the copying. See id. at 33; Dam
Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 562 & nn.19-20 (3d Cir. 2002);
Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992). The two step nature of the
analysis is traced to Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
10 Yankee, 259 F.3d at 32.
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merger doctrine and scones dfaire doctrine to dissect the Yankee labels and
remove much of their contents from the intrinsic similarity analysis: the
rectangular shape, ._the gold border, the small rectangular center box
containing the fragrance name, the "full-bleed" style of photography
(where the picture extends to the edges of the labels), and, in general, the
photographic representation of fruits, flowers, plants, and scented objects
on the labels.111  All of these were claimed to be scones dfaire elements,
merged elements, or elements that incorporated public domain features." 
2
On appeal, Yankee made the argument that this application ignored the
fact that there are myriad ways to photograph fruit, flowers, plants, and
scented objects and combine them in an attractive way by making artistic
choices' 3 much in the same way that Napoleon Sarony in the Sarony case
had to make artistic choices in his photographing of Oscar Wilde.
14
Yankee argued for a test of intrinsic similarity that allowed the finder of
fact to consider the "total look and feel" of the label." 5 After all, it is black
letter copyright law that a creative combination of unprotected elements can
obtain protection under copyright law 16 and such a combination deserves to
be regarded in the substantial similarity evaluation.' '7
The First Circuit rejected each argument. The court accepted the fact
that Yankee had proved that Bridgewater copied the labels;" 8 yet it
affirmed summary judgment for Bridgewater, stating that "even if
Bridgewater actually copied Yankee's labels, the merger doctrine operates
so that no reasonable juror could have found Bridgewater's labels to be
'substantially similar' to those of Yankee." 1 9 The court's rendering of the
merger doctrine held that:
Some ideas admit of only a limited number of expressions.
When there is essentially only one way to express an idea,
the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is
"'Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 140, 143-45, 148 (D. Mass.
2000).
...1d. at 145-46.
113 Yankee, 259 F.3d at 35.
11
4 Sarony v. Ehrich, 28 F. 79, 80 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
"'See Yankee, 259 F.3d at 32.
116 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
"
7TSee Yankee, 259 F.3d at 32.
"' Id. at 33.
119Md.
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no bar to copying that expression. [Even] [w]hen the idea
and its expression are not completely inseparable, there
may still be only a limited number of ways of expressing
the idea.
120
The court stated that in light of the merger doctrine's application in the
case of depictions of items found in nature or in everyday life,12' the
plaintiff must bear a "heavy burden" of showing near identity between the
two works.122 Finding it impossible for a jury to find that kind of "near
identity," the court affirmed the trial court's decision to take the issue away
from the jury.
123
The expansive application of the merger and scones 6 faire doctrines
was also affirmed in Matthews v. Freedman.124 The trial court refused to
compare the common elements of a souvenir t-shirt bearing the logo
"Someone Went to Boston and got me this shirt because they love me Very
much" 25 surrounded by a sailboat and a lobster with a competing souvenir
t-shirt bearing the logo "Someone Who Loves Me Went to Boston and Got
Me this Shirt" also surrounded by a sailboat and a lobster. 126 The Court of
Appeals admitted that the case presented a problem where:
An alleged infringing work taken as a whole may seem
"substantially similar" to the copyrighted work taken as a
whole, but the impression of similarity may rest heavily
upon similarities in the two works as to elements that are
120ld. at 36; see Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967)
(rules of a contest were so simple they merge with the expression of the rules). But see John G.
Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 42-44 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding
that the merger doctrine was inapplicable to architectural drawings where a restrictive covenant
made one method of developing the site legally easier and cheaper than others, but it did not
transform the drawings into the only physically possible means to express ideas for such
development).
121 Yankee, 259 F.3d at 36 (citing Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843
F.2d 600, 608-11 (1st Cir. 1988) (depicting deer in lawn ornaments); Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc.,
212 F.3d 1210, 1214-16 (11th Cir. 2000) (depicting a Bird Girl statute relating to the book and
film Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian,
446 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1971) (depicting a jeweled bee)).




124157 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1998).
1
25 Id. at 26 (random capitalization of words shown is the same as in the original).
1
26 1d. Each shirt had one or more other iconic symbols of Boston that were dissimilar.
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not copyrightable-because those elements are the
underlying ideas, or expressions that are not original with
the plaintiff, or for some like reason.
1 27
Each shirt had lettering drawn in a childish style, but the court affirmed
that the choice of rendering letters in a childish style was inevitable and
necessary.128  The use of similar iconic symbols of Boston was also
inevitable and necessary. 29 The fact that the words were so similar was
ignored because the court found that it was only the idea behind the words
that was similar.130  Rejecting the possibility that the two creators'
rendering and embodiment of the ideas might in fact be one creator copying
the other's embodiment of the ideas, and that improper copying is what the
court should be considering, the trial court instead approved the procedure
of expelling any part of the shirt that might, in fact, embody a stock image
or idea relating to Boston and people who buy t-shirts for loved ones.
131
The First Circuit declared, in effect, that the initial creator's copyright is so
thin that only a slavish copy-a complete, 100% true copy produced by
scanning or photocopying or photographic reproduction of the first author's
creation-would violate the first author's copyright in her work.
132
The most puzzling part of the First Circuit's analysis is that the court
recognizes that "entirely unoriginal expressions taken from others might
sometimes be combined in a way that gives rise to a new protectible [sic]
expression.' 133 The court also acknowledged that the ordinary observer
(intrinsic similarity) test in copyright precludes copying if the second
author's works are to the average observer substantially similar in design
and overall aesthetic appeal. 134 By dissecting out of the work all of the
elements that are supposedly merged with their underlying ideas or that
embody stock, or scones 4i faire, elements (leaving aside the fact that there
are myriad ways to embody a stock image or idea in a visual work), the
court leaves little or nothing from the original author's composition to
127d. at 27 (emphasis in original).
12
8 Id. at 28.
129id.
130id.




33 Id. at 28 (comparing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358-59
(1991)).
'34d. (citing Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608-11
(Ist Cir. 1988)).
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compare to the alleged plagiarist's work. The judgment in favor of the
plagiarist was affirmed. 35 To add insult to injury, the court also affirmed
the award of $25,000 in attorneys' fees to the defendant because in the
court's estimation the original artist chose to bring a weak, nonfrivolous,
case and argued for an unreasonable extension of copyright protection.
136
In these two cases, the First Circuit's expansive application of the
merger and scones ei faire doctrines took the cases away from the jury.
Average observers were not allowed to compare the works. The court
failed to acknowledge that the plaintiffs might have combined unprotectable
elements in a creative, original way, producing a complete and protectable
construct that would be attractive for copying-even in the face of fairly
certain evidence that the defendants did copy plaintiffs creation. After
stripping away what the judges thought were stock images and merged
elements, the court saw that little or nothing was left to plaintiffs' works in
both cases. Thus, with nothing to show to the average observers, there can
be nothing substantial that could have been copied by the defendant.
Summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in favor of the alleged
plagiarist is the inevitable result.
2. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the merger and scones i faire
doctrines has also led to the destruction and reduction of visual works at the
intrinsic similarity stage of the analysis. 37 The results of this analysis come
into starkest focus in Satava v. Lowry. 138 The court in Satava held that there
are obstacles to enforcing a copyright in a work that portrays or depicts a
natural object, in this case, a jellyfish. 39 Using the intrinsic similarity test,
the Ninth Circuit has held that unprotectable elements must be removed and
discarded before the finder of fact is to perform the lay person intrinsic
similarity analysis. 4° Guided by the principle that there must be only one
way to depict a jelly fish in a visual media, the Ninth Circuit intentionally
ignored the evidence collected by the district court in the case showing that
1351 Id. at 29.
136
1d.
137 See generally Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
38See id. at 810.
139 See id. at 810-813.
140See id.; see also Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003); Aliotti
v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987).
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there were literally hundreds of ways to depict jellyfish, including the
multiple ways produced by Satava and the many other ways attempted by
Lowry and his associates. 14' In fact, the court used this information against
the plaintiff by stating that it had examined dozens of photographs of glass-
in-glass jellyfish and found them all to be substantially similar. 14 2 The court
stated, "[t]hough none of the sculptures are identical, all of them are
substantially similar. They differ only insofar as an artist has added or
omitted some standard element."'
' 43
The belief that there is only one way to depict jellyfish in this art form
would have allowed the court to find the idea of a jellyfish and the
expression of the jellyfish merged. However, the court did not reach the
merger issue in favor of a vigorous application of the scones 6 faire doctrine
as the court held that every depiction of jellyfish is an amalgam of
unprotected standard images from nature. 144 The result of the analysis was
the holding that an artist who produces a work that portrays or depicts a
natural object will have an unenforceable copyright. 145  True, the court
allows that a paper-thin copyright might exist, but it anticipates that no
combination of unprotectable elements related to natural objects will add up
to a substantial amount when found in the same proportion in the
plagiarist's work.
146
The road to Satava in the Ninth Circuit was a long and uneven one.
Until recently, the circuit was not known for its hostility to the original
contributions of artists working in visual media. It may come as a surprise
to some that the Ninth Circuit is recognized as establishing the "total
concept and feel" standard in the analysis of intrinsic similarity of visual
works that usually coincides with a restrictive view of the merger and
scones 6 faire doctrines. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Products, Inc. v.
141See Satava v. Lowry, No. CIV-S-01-701 GEB/DAD, slip op. at *2-4, 11 (E.D. Cal. June
12, 2002) (Lowry affirmed that there were "a myriad of ways that one could portray jellyfish in
glass art;" Lowry's associate described and produced multiple shapes and forms for jellyfish in
glass art; Satava produced approximately 300 unique and individual glass-in-glass sculptures of
jellyfish a month).
1
42See Satava, 323 F.3d at 812.
143Id. at 812 n.5.
'4See id. at 810-11, 812 & n.5 (finding it unnecessary to reach the merger doctrine issue as it
had produced the same effect under the rationale that Satava could not claim a monopoly in any
realistic depictions of jellyfish, and that any depiction of jellyfish must necessarily be a
combination of unprotectable standard images).
141 Id. at 811.
146See id. at 812.
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McDonald's Corp. brought the phrase to the two prong extrinsic and
intrinsic similarity test. 147 The first prong in the analysis was an extrinsic
analysis to determine similarity in the general ideas underlying the
expression in the two works. 48 Because some material that would appear to
be similar would be unprotected under the originality and idea-expression
restrictions (public domain themes and concepts, merged ideas, scones d
faire), the court instructed that analytic dissection is appropriate under
extrinsic analysis so that protected expression in the first work can be
compared with allegedly similar expression in the second work.14 9 Expert
witnesses can aid in determining when components of the work are
similar. 150 The Ninth Circuit indicated that in many cases the extrinsic
similarity may be determined by the court as an issue of law.' 51
The second part of the analysis was an intrinsic test that compared the
substantiality of the similarity in the expression of both works. 52 The
intrinsic similarity test was to be determined by the ordinary reasonable
person. 53  The finder of fact was to examine the works as a whole to
evaluate their "total concept and feel.' 5 4 Therefore, analytic dissection at
this stage of analysis was prohibited. 1
55
1
47 See Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164-67 (9th Cir. 1977). The case involved the claim of the creators of the seemingly innocent
children's show, H. R. Pufnstuf, against McDonald's, who allegedly copied the central puppet
characters from Pufnstuf to populate the fanciful McDonaldland with Mayor McCheese, Grimace,
and Hamburglar. Later, Pufnstuf was more closely examined for its marijuana references (e.g.,
puffing stuff; H.R. for hand rolled), which was held to be consistent with McDonald's interest in
the Puffistuf characters to attract not only hungry children who are fond of larger than life puppets
with oversized heads, but also stoners with the munchies. See
http://www.cannabisculture.com/articles/2926.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
1








1141d. at 1167 (Sid & Marty Krofft gets the credit for working this standard into the intrinsic
similarity test even though the opinion acknowledges Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.,
429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970), as the origin of the four word phrase, "total concept and
feel".)
'Id. at 1164 (quoting Twentieth Century Fox-Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582
(9th Cir. 1944)) ("The two works involved in this appeal should be considered and tested, not
hypercritically or with meticulous scrutiny, but by the observations and impressions of the average
reasonable reader and spectator.").
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The two-part test was applied to realistic depictions of animals in
Kamar International, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co.156  Far from placing
insurmountable obstacles in the face of the creator of such works, in 1981
the Ninth Circuit was positively offended by the proposition that realistic
depictions of animals could not be original enough to be copyrightable:
"Berrie makes the novel contention that realistic depictions of live animals
are not copyrightable . ... We find no authority for Berrie's proposition.
Anyone can copyright anything, if he adds something original to its
expression.' ' 157 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court in part for
using the analytic dissection test in the intrinsic similarity prong of the two
part substantial similarity test.'58
The court started to turn the comer on the merger and scones d faire
doctrines in Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co. 159 In a case involving depictions of
actual creatures (dinosaurs), the court reconsidered the Sid & Marty Krofft
formulation of the intrinsic similarity test so as to better accommodate the
merger doctrine.160 The court noted:
Appellants argue correctly that the district court's
determination as to substantial similarity of expression
relied incorrectly on the analytic dissection of the dissimilar
characteristics of the dolls. Similarity of expression exists
only when "the total concept and feel of the works" is
substantially similar. Dissection of dissimilarities is
inappropriate because it distracts a reasonable observer
from a comparison of the total concept and feel of the
works.
161
The subtle insertion of the word dissimilarities is important because the
court makes a point about dissection of similarities in an effort to open the
door to the merger doctrine in visual media cases. 62 The court held that:
To the extent that it is necessary to determine whether
similarities result from unprotectable expression, it is
156657 F.2d 1059, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1981).
'571d. at 1061.
1
58 See id. at 1063.
159831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
160Id. at 902.
1
6 1/d. at 901 (citations omitted).
162See id.
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appropriate under Krofft's intrinsic test to perform analytic
dissection of similarities. Although even unprotectable
material should be considered when determining if there is
substantial similarity of expression, no substantial
similarity may be found under the intrinsic test where
analytic dissection demonstrates that all similarities in
expression arise from the use of common ideas.
163
Thus, dissection entered the intrinsic portion of the similarity test, albeit
after the "total concept and feel" of the works as a whole was evaluated by
the finder of fact. 164 If there was no substantial, intrinsic similarity as to the
works as a whole, the case was closed; but if there was substantial, intrinsic
similarity as to the works as a whole, the similar features of the works could
then be dissected and separately analyzed to make sure that all similarities
were not as to unprotected elements. 1
65
Aliotti's innovation was not limited to taking down the total concept and
feel standard of intrinsic similarity analysis. Alliotti also marks the
expanded application of the merger doctrine and scones d faire doctrine in
visual media cases in the Ninth Circuit. 166  Courts who are intent on
expanding the application of the doctrine find it hard to accomplish this in
the face of the total concept and feel standard. 167 The total concept and feel
standard finds its support in the bedrock copyright law stating that original
combinations of uncopyrightable components can be protected.
168
Therefore, the evaluator must look at the total combination, not a stripped
down combination when comparing it to the alleged plagiarist's work. By
shelving the total concept and feel test, and stressing the dissection and
filtration of allegedly merged and scones d faire material, the court creates
the opportunity for summary disposition of the suit-the more material that
is stripped away from plaintiffs work, the more comfortable the court will
be with finding as a matter of law that no average person could find the two
works to be substantially similar as to the few items remaining in the
plaintiff s work. If a court takes the total concept and feel standard
seriously, it almost guarantees a jury trial unless the two works in their
163 Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).




168See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
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entirety are simply and manifestly dissimilar. Taking away a stripped down
plaintiff's creation from the jury is an easier call than making an aesthetic
determination that an average person could not find substantial similarity in
the two works as a whole.
After Aliotti opened the door of the intrinsic test to the merger doctrine,
the total part of the total concept and feel standard was not long for the
Ninth Circuit's world. The wheels came off dramatically when the circuit
had to face visual elements of computer programs in a monumental struggle
between Apple and Microsoft for the rights of Microsoft to develop the
graphical user interface (GUI) that became Windows 2.03 and 3.0 and
opened the door to the release of Windows 95.169 The facts of the case
should have produced a narrow holding: Apple had entered into a license
agreement with Microsoft that allowed Microsoft to adapt many of the
graphical user interface features of Apple's operating system into Windows
2.03.170 As a contract case, the outcome of the case is unremarkable: In the
core provision of the license, Apple allowed its main competitor to copy
and adapt many attractive elements of Apple's GUI in exchange for the
right to use and adapt any attractive GUI features Microsoft developed
during the license term.17  Apple came to regret the scope of the contract
because it helped Microsoft to develop its product into the market-
dominating operating system that we know today.172 However, the district
court and the Ninth Circuit were forced to address issues beyond the
contract's interpretation. 73 Apple raised tangential copyright issues as to
the size, placement, and appearance of certain icons and certain features of
169The struggle produced six district court opinions: Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (Apple I); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th
Cir. 1994) (Apple II); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal.
1991), af'd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (Apple III); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
779 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (Apple IV); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), affd, 35 F.3d 1435
(Apple V); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 35
F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (Apple VI). The end result is the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
170Apple, 35 F.3d at 1438.
.71 See id. at 1440 & n.8 (Other provisions pertained to the delay of the release of Microsoft's
Excel product for platforms other than Apple's Macintosh platform and the development of a new
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the design and appearance of the "windows" on the GUI that were not
sufficiently addressed in the license between the parties.174 It is in this
discussion of copyright law by the Ninth Circuit that an alarming
interpretation of the merger and scones d faire doctrines in the context of
visual works was spawned.
As in other computer program cases, the district court was shaken by the
possibility that programs might be subject simultaneously to the limiting
doctrines of originality, functionality, standardization, scones 6 faire, and
merger. 175 As a result, the district court dissected the disputed features of
the Macintosh and Windows interfaces based on a list of similarities
submitted by Apple to decide which were protectable.176 Thereafter, the
district court applied the limiting doctrines of originality, functionality,
standardization, sc~nes i faire, and merger to arrive at a finding of no
copying of protectable elements in Windows 2.03 or 3.0.177 The court then
held that the Windows 2.03 and 3.0 works as a whole would be compared
with Apple's works for virtual identity. 178 When Apple declined to oppose
motions for summary judgment of noninfringement for lack of virtual
identity, however, judgments in favor of Microsoft were entered.'79
The Ninth Circuit approved of the dissection and discard of all allegedly
unprotectable elements. 180 First, it summarized Apple's objections to the
district court's ruling as follows:
Apple makes a number of related arguments
challenging the district court's copyright analysis. It
contends that the district court deprived its works of
meaningful protection by dissecting them into individual
elements and viewing each element in isolation. Because
the Macintosh GUI is a dynamic audiovisual work, Apple
argues that the "total concept and feel" of its works-that
is, the selection and arrangement of related images and
their animation-must be compared with that of the







180 See id. at 1439.
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asserts that in this case, the court had no occasion to dissect
its works into discrete elements because Microsoft and HP
[Hewlett Packard, Microsoft's licensee] virtually mimicked
the composition, organization, arrangement and dynamics
of the Macintosh interface, as shown by striking similarities
in the animation of overlapping windows and the design,
layout and animation of icons. Apple also argues that even
if dissection were appropriate, the district court should not
have eliminated from jury consideration those elements that
are either licensed or unprotected by copyright. Though
stated somewhat differently, all of these contentions boil
down to the same thing: Apple wants an overall
comparison of its works to the accused works for
substantial similarity rather than virtual identity. 
181
In Apple, The Ninth Circuit knew it was evaluating a complex visual
work rather than program codes registered as a literary work, but it was not
ready to allow a total look and feel analysis of the overall graphical user
interface of Apple compared to Microsoft's GUI. 182  The Ninth Circuit
stated that the law of the circuit had changed in Brown Bag Software v.
Symantec Corp., and that the intrinsic similarity test now included an
analytic dissection and rejection of components before evaluating the less
than total concept and some of the feel of the two programs.' 83 In fact, the
Brown Bag court had not held this and in fact had not reached the issue.
1 84
In any event, Apple drove a stake through the heart of evaluation of visual
works: There would be a two stage test with analytical dissection at each
stage and rejection of parts that were supposedly subject to the merger and
181 Id. at 1442 (emphasis in original).
182See id. at 1442-43.
83See id. at 1443 (citing Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475-76
(9th Cit. 1992)).
184Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1475-76. Apple also cited Shaw v. Lindhein, an opinion
that in dicta made the remarkably backwards statement that the intrinsic similarity evaluation of
visual works such as were involved in Aliotti (stuffed dinosaurs) and Kalpakian (bee shaped
jewelry) was well suited for determination by the court on a summary judgment motion when the
merger doctrine is alleged to be involved, but the same could not be said for literary works. 919
F.2d 1353, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1990). The Shaw court held that if a showing of similarity is made
on the extrinsic evaluation of a literary work, it is wrong for the court to resolve the intrinsic
evaluation of the work on a summary judgment motion. Id. at 1361. Instead, the finder of fact
must make the subjective evaluation of the literary work. Id.
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scones cifaire doctrines. 185 There would be no subjective evaluation of the
total concept and feel of any visual work that allegedly merged with its
underlying ideas (there being a drastically limited number of ways of
depicting the idea visually) or allegedly embodied stock images that must
be copied in order to depict the idea.'
86
In Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., Apple's holding was interpreted to
mean that in visual art cases, the court is to filter out unprotectable elements
in both the extrinsic and intrinsic similarity tests. 187 Oddly, the court did
not think that this bears on the ability of an artist or author to receive
protection for original combinations of unprotectable elements as described
in Feist.188  Nor did the court believe that this prevents the intrinsic
similarity evaluator from considering the total concept and feel of the two
works.189 The court stated:
This does not mean that at the end of the day, when the
works are considered under the intrinsic test, they should
not be compared as a whole. Nor does it mean that
infringement cannot be based on original selection and
arrangement of unprotected elements. However, the
unprotectable elements have to be identified, or filtered,
before the works can be considered as a whole.190
The end of this line of thinking is a case like Satava.'91 But along the
way we encounter Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., a case involving
commercial photography. 92 The court was receptive to the argument that
there were only a drastically limited number of ways of depicting a Skyy
Vodka bottle in photography, and thus used the merger doctrine to strip
away the apparently similar features of plaintiffs and defendant's
photography. 93 What similarities were left after the merger analysis were
' See Apple, 35 F.3d at 1442-47.
186 See id.
87 297 F.3d 815, 825-26 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The basic mode of analysis for comparison of the
literary elements applies to comparison of the art work. As with literary works, unprotectible [sic]
elements should not be considered when applying the extrinsic test to art work.").
188See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
'
8 9 See Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 826.
19Id. (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994)).
191See generally Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
192 See generally 323 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003).
9 3 See id. at 765-66 ("Though the Ets-Hokin and Skyy photographs are indeed similar, their
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rejected as scones 6 faire of commercial photography. 194 Plaintiff argued
that application of the merger doctrine and scones 6 faire doctrine to
photography contradicted the established law regarding the originality and
creativity of photography as an artistic medium. 195 The court failed to see
the point; it held that photography certainly can achieve the level of
originality required for copyright protection but still be susceptible to the
merger and scones t faire doctrines because similarities in photographs
depicting the same subject necessarily flow from the subject matter and
such similarities are, "as a practical matter, indispensable, or at least
standard."' 196  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment to defendant. 
197
3. Fifth Circuit
In evaluating computer programs, the Fifth Circuit embraces the
abstraction-filtration test, more popularly known as the abstraction-
filtration-comparison test. 198  The goal of the test is to separate out
unprotectable elements from the original work before the finder of fact
makes a comparison with the allegedly infringing work.199 In practice, the
first step of the test is dissection, for only when the parts of a program or
other work (starting with object code, source code, subroutines, and
program structure, and working up to an articulation of the program's
ultimate function) are dissected can they be abstracted to their appropriate
level of generality.200 Then each dissected part can be examined separately
to see if any part is essentially composed of uncopyrightable ideas,
similarity is inevitable, given the shared concept, or idea, of photographing the Skyy bottle.").
194See id. at 766 (citing Apple, 35 F.3d at 1442).
'95 See id. at 765 (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
1
9 6 See id. at 765-66 (citing Apple, 35 F.3d at 1444).
197Id. at 764.
198See Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th
Cir. 2000); see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (first
recognizing the abstraction test); Eng'g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335,
1342-43 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the abstraction filtration comparison test); Gates Rubber Co.
v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing the abstraction filtration
comparison test); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2nd Cir. 1992)
(discussing the abstraction filtration-comparison test).
199 Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co., 220 F.3d at 401.
2
00See id.; Eng'g Dynamics, 26 F.3d at 1342-43; Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 834; Altai, 982
F.2d at 706-07.
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processes, facts, public domain information, merged material, or scones d
faire material.20 ' Those parts that fit one of these categories are thrown out
(filtered out in the terms of the test), but the end result is the same: The
finder of fact never is to see them or consider them when comparing the
original work with the allegedly infringing work.20 2 To the extent that this
stripping down process renders the original work an incomplete chop-shop
jalopy that has alternately missing doors and windows, so be it. Under the
abstraction-filtration test, the finder of fact may never see the original work
as a whole and evaluate its total concept and feel.
As rooted as the abstraction-filtration test is in computer cases, the Fifth
Circuit has been inconsistent in applying the test in other factual situations.
In Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records Inc.,20 3 the court held
that at the probative similarity stage,20 4 two competing musical works
should be compared as a whole and "in their entirety, including both
protectable and unprotectable elements. 2 5  As in most jurisdictions, the
Fifth Circuit, in the absence of proof of actual copying, requires an initial
showing of (1) defendant's access to the original work, and (2) a showing
of probative similarity of the two works to indicate probable copying.
20 6
Then, in the absence of defendant's proof of independent creation, the
works are evaluated for substantial similarity.20 7 Even at the substantial
similarity stage, the court affirmed the jury instruction that the "total
concept and feel" of the two works must be evaluated.20 8
Lower courts in the Fifth Circuit have not been as expansive in their
application of the merger and scones dfaire doctrines in visual art cases. In
Maggio v. Liztech Jewelry, the Eastern District of Louisiana considered the
merger doctrine in the context of evaluation of decorative jewelry. 20 9 The
2 'See Altai, 982 F.2d at 706-07; Computer Mgmt. Assistance, 220 F.3d at 401; Eng'g
Dynamics, 26 F.3d at 1342-44; Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 834-35.
212 See Altai, 982 F.2d at 707-10; Computer Mgmt. Assistance, 220 F.3d at 402; Eng'g
Dynamics, 26 F.3d at 1344-45; Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 836, 841.
203394 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2004).
2 4 This is held to be another wording for the "extrinsic similarity" step of the analysis, or
whether the ideas underlying the original work were copied. See, e.g., id. at 373-74 & n.13.





18 See id. at 373-74.
29912 F. Supp. 216, 223 (E.D. La. 1996).
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court held that the merger doctrine applies only when there is only one way
to express an idea.21° Where the "idea is clearly capable of different forms
of expression," the idea does not merge with any one form of expression.21'
In Maggio, the court found that the jewelry pins consisting of silhouettes of
natural or symbolic shapes cut from chrome and embellished with copper
wire and beading obviously was only one possible expression of the idea of
making jewelry based on the silhouettes of natural and symbolic forms and
shapes.2  The merger doctrine took nothing away from the original
creator's works.213 Nor did the court strike away parts of the jewelry-the
central part of the jewelry, the silhouette of a natural creature or symbolic
shape-on the basis of the scones dfaire doctrine before allowing the finder
of fact to consider the similarity of the two competing sets of jewelry.214
Instead, the jewelry was to be evaluated as a whole for a comparison of the
total concept and feel of the works.21 5
4. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit is as unapologetic as the First Circuit in applying the
merger and scones dt faire doctrines to visual works. The court states that
"before comparing similarities between two works a court should first
identify and eliminate those elements that are unoriginal and therefore
21°d.; see also Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 801 (5th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (legislation enacting provision of copyrighted model code becomes part of the law, and
the law cannot be copyrighted; the merger doctrine applies because the legislation is the only way
to express the idea of the law).
211 See Maggio, 912 F. Supp. at 223.
212 See id.
213 See id. at 223 n.5 (distinguishing Tabra, Inc. v. Treasures de Paradise Designs, Inc., No. C
90-0155 MHP, 1990 WL 126187 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 1990) (mem.) (expression of "primitive-
look" bone, stone, shell, and beads jewelry held merged with idea of the same in that there was no
distinguishing arrangement of the raw materials evident in the original works) and Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) (expression of naturalistic
jeweled bee pin held merged with idea of jeweled bee pin where pin was a lifelike representation
of a natural creature and the court thought there was no unique or original arrangement of
jewels)).
214 See Maggio, 912 F. Supp. at 223; see also Naghi v. Europe's Finest, Inc., 114 Fed. App'x
606, 607 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that even though hemp leaves are natural objects, expression of
hemp leaf Mardi Gras necklace did not merge with idea of same because hemp leaves were
susceptible to multiple expressions).
215See Maggio, 912 F. Supp. at 223.
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unprotected., 216  The court states that it will be faithful to Feist which
"favors an approach that involves reducing the [substantial similarity]
comparison to elements that are original. 217 In and of themselves, these
statements are unremarkable-unprotectable elements should be
unprotectable and unoriginal components are unprotectable. But when
combined with an expansive interpretation of the merger and scones d faire
doctrines, it spells disaster for visual works that feature expressions of real
world objects and entities.
The Sixth Circuit accepts the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.
21 8
The Sixth Circuit follows the approach taken in Sturdza v. United Arab
Emirates, which in turn took the test from the Tenth Circuit in Country Kids
'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, which itself borrowed from the Second Circuit
in Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai.219 Thus, the originality rubric of the
Sixth Circuit is descended from computer software cases. In computer
cases, the test ruthlessly filters out merged items and scones d faire
elements to avoid the situation where a programmer will comer the market
on "the only and essential means," or one of the only practical and efficient
ways, to accomplish a programming task using a selected computer
220language and targeting a selected computer hardware configuration.
Technical and practical requirements, design standards, and appropriate
methods of operation dictate programming choices rather than the creative
input of the creator, and in these circumstances the copyright requirement of
originality precludes broad protection of the code written by the
programmer whether the rationale is expressed as lack of originality,
functionality over creative design, merger of programming elements with
the idea of the program's operation, or scones d faire program elements. 1
The reductionist approach manifested in the abstraction-filtration test is
also manageable in functional, non-software-related situations that mimic
216Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Small v. Exhibit Enters.,
Inc., 364 F. Supp. 2d 648, 652 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
217Kohus, 328 F.3d at 854 (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991)).
211d. at 855 & n.1.
219See Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1295-96 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Country
Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1996); Computer Assocs. Int'l,
Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1992).




Baker and Feist, which are the classic cases involving non-original works
222created to present data. In ATC Distribution Group, Inc. v. Whatever It
Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., and Tastefully Simple, Inc. v. Two
Sisters Gourmet, L.L.C., the Sixth Circuit followed the approach taken in
Baker and Feist by applying the originality test and merger doctrine to find
that an automobile parts catalogue and standard forms produced for
reporting sales tax information and other food sales customer information
were uncopyrightable because they simply allow for the reporting of
standard information in the auto parts business and food sales business.223
There was no creativity in the arrangement of the parts listings or parts
numbers in A TC nor in the line items on the forms and categories listed in
Tastefully Simple that were not merged with the idea of keeping track of
categories of information as a necessary part of doing business. 224 ATC and
Tastefully Simple are on all fours with Baker and Feist.
In a literary context, the abstraction-filtration test at least provides a
framework to consider the similarity of literary works by focusing on the
level of abstraction required to find that the works are the same. 5 Judge
Hand's process of abstraction in Nichols did not answer the question of how
abstract is too abstract.226 But courts such as the Sixth Circuit are not
deterred in finding that at the level of abstraction needed in the case at hand
is too abstract to support an infringement claim, and the question should be
taken away from the jury.227 Audio visual media, such as motion pictures
and television, most often are analyzed as literary works because it is an
unusual case where there is a question about actual audio and visual-
copying (taping) of a motion picture, stage play, or television show outside
of the de minimis use or fair use contexts. 8  Instead, the abstraction-
filtration test is used when an allegation is made that characters, plots,
scenes, or situations are stolen from a motion picture, stage play, or
222See generally Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
223See ATC Distribution Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402
F.3d 700, 710-11 (6th Cir. 2005); Tastefully Simple, Inc. v. Two Sisters Gourmet, L.L.C., 134
Fed. App'x 1, 4-5 (6th Cir. 2005).
224 Tastefilly Simple, 134 Fed. App'x at 4-5; ATC, 402 F.3d at 711-12.
225 See Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 296-300 (6th Cir. 2004); Murray Hill
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 315-21 (6th Cir. 2004).
226 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
227See, e.g., Stromback, 384 F.3d at 297-99; Murray Hill, 361 F.3d at 315-24.
228 See Stromback, 384 F.3d at 293.
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television show. 2 29 The filtration step still works to cancel out merged
elements and scones 6 faire character types, plot devices, standard scenes,
and common situations from literary works.2  Problems arise, however,
when a test created for computer software or the reporting of factual
information begins to be applied in creative, visual media cases. 31
The filtration step, in the context of copying of static visual media
sounds innocuous until you expand the definition of merger and scones 6
faire. The Sixth Circuit in Kohus opined that latches for an outdoor play
area were functional, which almost necessarily means that parts of their
design are dictated by efficiency.232 Rather than seeing the situation as one
in which multiple efficient original designs might be possible, the court
seemed to be looking for an excuse to find that only one set of
characteristics would be efficient, and thus find that those characteristics
were dictated by the task. Therefore, they are unoriginal, and are
unprotectable under the merger doctrine.233  Similarly, under the scones d
faire doctrine, the court seems predisposed to find that certain
characteristics of the latches must have been "'dictated by external factors
such as particular business practices[,]' ... standard industry practices for
constructing latches, or safety standards. 234 If found, these features are
filtered out largely based on the court's subjective interpretation of what is
necessary, functional, efficient, or original.235
Potential for greater respect for visual works is afoot in the Sixth
Circuit. In Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. Gemmy Industrial, Corp., the Sixth
Circuit purported to apply the abstraction-filtration test in the context of a
229E.g., Stromback, 384 F.3d at 296-297; Murray Hill, 361 F.3d at 319-20.
23 0See Stromback, 384 F.3d at 296-97; Murray Hill, 361 F.3d at 319-320.
231See, e.g., Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857-58 (6th Cir. 2003) (drawing of a latch);
Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1295-96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (architectural
designs); County Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1996)
(wooden dolls).
232 See Kohus, 328 F.3d at 856.
233 
See id.
2341d. (quoting Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co. v. Robert F. Castro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 401
(5th Cir. 2000)).
235 Compare id. (many aspects of play-area latches filtered out as driven by industry practices,
functionality, efficiency, or necessity), with Kellman v. Coca-Cola Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 670, 676
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (aspects of foam headgear designed to look like a W~ing nut fastening device
were not filtered out because court embraced the creators' original and creative conception of the
work as a visual pun on the phrase "wing nuts" as nutty fanatics of the Detroit Red Wings hockey
team).
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dispute involving a two-dimensional paper design for creating a "crashing
witch" craft project that was compared to a competing three-dimensional
C4 236"crashing witch" creation. The court found the works were purely
aesthetic (as opposed to functional or utilitarian). 237 In the analysis, the
court considered the argument that most of the purported similarities of the
two witch creations were merged with the idea of a crashing witch or were
scones d faire of witches in general: black clothing, curled boots, flowing
cape, and a broom.238 But the court refused to end the analysis there.
Instead, the court followed the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Mattel,
Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Manufacturing Co. 239 In Goldberger Doll, the
Second Circuit recognized that works embodying common features are not
without protecticn from direct copying. 240 Even though in that case Mattel
claimed a copyright for Barbie dolls that embody common doll features
such as widely spaced eyes, upturned noses, and bow lips, the Second
Circuit (as quoted by the Sixth Circuit) held that:
There are innumerable ways of making upturned noses,
bow lips, and widely spaced eyes. Even if the record had
shown that many dolls possess upturned noses, bow lips,
and wide-spaced eyes, it would not follow that each such
doll-assuming it was independently created and not
copied from others-would not enjoy protection from
241copying.
The finding that there are common features typical of the idea of a doll's
face or scones d faire of doll faces in general does not strike these features
from the case under the merger doctrine or scones 6 faire doctrine.242
Instead, the Sixth Circuit followed the Second Circuit in concluding that the
court must compare the creative embodiment or arrangement of these
common features in the original creator's work for evidence of direct
copying.243 In Winfield, the court held that there was no similarity between
236See 147 Fed. App'x 547, 552-54 (6th Cir. 2005).
2371d. at 551.
238 Id. at 554.
2391d. at 554-56 (citing Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133 (2d Cir.
2004)).
240365 F.3d at 135.
241 Winfield, 147 Fed. App'x at 554-55 (quoting Goldberger Doll, 365 F.3d at 135).
242See id. at 555.
243See id. at 554-55.
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the embodiment of the witch features in the one work compared to the
other, thus summary judgment for the defendant still was affirmed by the
Sixth Circuit.244 But the appreciation of visual works is on the rise in the
circuit.
5. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit implements the reductionist method under the name
of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to determine whether one
product is substantially similar to another.245 First, the court separates the
ideas (and basic utilitarian functions), which are not protectable, from the
particular expression of work.246  Then, the court filters out the
unprotectable components of the product from the original expression.247
Finally, the court compares the remaining protected elements to determine
if the two works are substantially similar.24 8
In Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc., plaintiff was a wholesale doll
manufacturer that sold wooden dolls similar in size and shape to traditional
paper dolls.249 In mid-1993, plaintiff noticed defendants marketing and
selling similar wooden paper dolls, and subsequently brought suit for
copyright infringement.250  Defendants claimed that while their dolls
employed the concept of plaintiffs dolls, their dolls had distinctly different
features, such as the eyes, hair, and nose.25' Plaintiff argued that the
wooden dolls were a form of expression of paper dolls, rather than an idea
of a doll.252 The court stated, "to the extent that the idea and the particular
expression cannot be separated, the work cannot be protected by copyright
because 'protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a
monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner.' 253 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court's characterization of wooden dolls as an
244Id. at 556.











21d. at 1285 (citations omitted).
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idea rather than a protected expression.254  In response to the plaintiffs
argument that the features of the dolls are still copyrightable, the court
stated: "[T]o the extent that the shape and size of Plaintiff's dolls are not
inherent in the idea of a wooden paper doll, they are typical paper doll
features found in the public domain and therefore are not copyrightable. 255
After abstracting the idea from the expression and filtering out the
unprotectable elements of the dolls, the court then looked to determine
whether the protectable portions of the original work that had been copied
constituted a substantial part of the original work.256 In determining
substantial similarity, the court opined that the traditional test is "whether
the accused work is so similar to the plaintiffs work that an ordinary
reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully
appropriated the plaintiffs protectable expression by taking material of
substance and value. 257
In Todd v. Montana Silversmiths, Inc., two artists who produce western-
themed jewelry squared off over competing barbed-wire bracelet and
matching earrings creations. 8 Even though the court stated that "one can
imagine any number of original ways to rearrange silver wire, barbs, [and]
end caps,"259 the court eagerly applied the merger doctrine and took out the
public domain elements of barbed-wire effects, hoop-style bracelets, and
26earrings. 60 Plaintiff argued that the individual elements are not the focus of
the originality tests, but rather the overall design (in plaintiffs words, the
"creative gestalt") of the work.261 Citing Feist, plaintiff asserted that
copyright protection attached to the particular way she formed, placed,
balanced, and harmonized together the elements of her barbed wire styled
jewelry.262 The court in its unhumble opinion did not think that plaintiffs
combination of elements had any originality.263 The court held that plaintiff
254 /d. at 1286.
255 1d. at 1287 (citation omitted).
256 1d"
257
/d. at 1288 (quoting Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
614 (7th Cir. 1982), superseded by rule in part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as recognized in Scandia
Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985)).
258379 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1111 (D. Colo. 2005).
259/d. at 1113.
26°See id. at 1112-13.
261 See id. at 1112.
262id.
263
8ee id. at 1113.
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"arranged [the elements] in a way that by all objective measures still
matches the elemental arrangement of barbed-wire." 264 The court must have
supposed that the artist simply walked out and found barbed wire hoops
laying around in the shape of spurs, cowboy hats, and boots, and then just
dusted them off and attached a post and clasp to some to distinguish the
bracelets from the earrings. Thus, plaintiff could not preclude defendant
from producing barbed wire jewelry in the exact same configurations of
western symbols (boots, spurs, and cowboy hats).265
The ordinary observer test, as applied by the Tenth Circuit, does not
require a work to be a virtual copy of a protected one.266 Nor does it turn on
whether an ordinary observer would confuse the two works in their
entirety.267 Rather, the test only answers whether a reasonable person
would conclude that "[a] defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiffs
protectable expression by taking material of substance and value.2 68
Thanks to the merger and the scones 6 faire doctrines, so much of the
plaintiffs work can be stripped away that it is easy, as a matter of law, to
imagine that no other work could be substantially similar to the plaintiffs,
regardless of whether another started out to copy it or not.
6. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit's application of the merger and scones d faire
doctrines in cases involving literary works is unremarkable. 269  It is its
approach to the two doctrines in cases involving visual works that earns it
its placement among the circuits favoring an expansive application of the
doctrines. In Leigh v. Warner Brothers, Inc. the court applied the merger
and scones t faire doctrines in its analysis of photographer Jack Leigh's
photographs of the Bird Girl statue in Bonaventure Cemetery in Savannah,
Georgia that were allegedly copied for use in the promotion of the film,
Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil.270 The court pointed out several
264id.
2 6 See id. at 1113-14.
266See Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996).
267 
See id.
268 Id. (quoting Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th
Cir. 1982), superseded by rule in part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as recognized in Scandia Down
Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985)).
269See generally Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Herzog v. Castle Rock
Entm't., 193 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 1999).
27 0See 212 F.3d 1210, 1213-15 (1 lth Cir. 2000).
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obvious restrictions on the protectable content of Leigh's work, including
the subject matter of the work (the statue itself) and the setting of the
photograph in Bonaventure Cemetery as the appearance of the statute and
the cemetery are facts and not copyrightable. 271 Further, the court stated
that any connotations surrounding the statue as associated with the mood,
themes of the novel, or its setting are ideas and thus unprotectable even
though these associations may owe their origin to Leigh's original use of
his photograph to illustrate the cover of the novel, Midnight in the Garden
of Good and Evil.272
The Eleventh Circuit recognized the lighting, shading, timing, angle,
and film choices as protected elements of Leigh's work.273 Leigh stressed
that the court should also look at the combined effect of these separate
elements as creating an eerie mood and suggesting the spirituality of the
scene. 274 The court disagreed, finding that "eerie moods" and "spiritual
moods" were scones d faire of cemeteries.275 The court did not stop to
dwell on the incongruity of the finding that Leigh had copied a stock image
of an eerie mood or a spiritual mood when he photographed the Bird Girl
statue.276 The court was reluctant to allow the comparison of the total
concept and especially the feeling evoked by the complete work for the
same reason that Leigh was demanding such an evaluation: that the viewer
would be attracted by the mood evoked by the photograph and would be
unable to untangle the mood effects of the subject matter itself from the
creative additions of Leigh.277 It approved of the lower court's dissection
and evaluation of the similarities and dissimilarities of the Leigh
photograph and the images of the Bird Girl that appear in the film and the
court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on the film footage, but
did not approve of the lower court's grant of summary judgment on the
promotional still photographs created by defendants. 278 The court found that
27 1
Id. at 1214-15.
272See id. at 1214; see also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d
821, 829 n.1 1(1lth Cir. 1982) (idea of soft sculpture human-figure doll is not copyrightable).
27 3Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1215.







278See id. at 1215-16.
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these photographs might be found by an average viewer to be substantially
similar to Leigh's photographs, and thus reversed and remanded the case.279
7. Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit is neutral on the application of the merger and
scones 6t faire doctrines because in a copyright claim, the Federal Circuit
applies copyright law as interpreted by the regional circuit wherein the facts
of the case arose.280 Thus, the Federal Circuit in Amini Innovation Corp. v.
Anthony California, Inc. was happy to apply the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation and application of the merger and scones dt faire doctrines as
reflected in its substantial similarity tests.281 The court reversed the trial
court for having taken on the intrinsic similarity analysis of carved
ornamental designs on woodwork without acknowledging the fact intensive
nature of the analysis which made the case inappropriate for summary
judgment on the intrinsic analysis part of the test.
282
The United States Court of Federal Claims produced a remarkably
expansive opinion applying the merger and scones d faire doctrines to a
work depicting a heart-shaped picture of Earth.283 The jurisdiction of the
court was triggered because the artist, Meade, accused the United States
Postal Service of copying his heart-shaped Earth design on a postage
stamp.284 The court held that Meade's work was uncopyrightable under the
merger doctrine because the entire depiction was an idea not an
28expression. 85 Furthermore, any trivial variations added by the creative,
original input of the artist, such as the color, placement, and appearance of
the continents on the Earth picture, were dismissed as scones 6 faire
elements dictated by the requirements of any depiction of the scene.286 In
what might be described as stunning incongruity, the court plainly stated
that "[w]hile a heart-shaped picture of earth certainly can be considered an
279
See id. at 1216.
28°Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
281 See 439 F.3d at 1368.
212 See id. at 1370.
283See Meade v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 367, 369-72 (1992), aff'd, 5 F.3d 1503 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (unpublished table decision).
284Meade, 27 Fed. Cl. at 370-72.
2.ld. at 371.
286 See id. at 372-73.
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expression of a larger idea, such a picture is itself capable of being
expressed in myriad ways, each varying depending on the selection and
arrangement of continents, colors, words, and other details. 287 Ignoring the
maxim cited above, that when myriad variations of a scene are possible, a
myriad of protectable copyrights can coexist,288 the court granted summary
judgment for the defendant.289
B. Circuits Restricting the Application of the Merger and Scenes &
Faire Doctrines in the Visual Media Context
The important difference between the circuits presented in this section
and the circuits presented above is not in the comparison test they use, but
rather in whether or not they have a mature and circumscribed
understanding of the merger and scones d faire doctrines in the context of
visual works. The particular version of the substantial similarity test used is
not nearly as important. A circuit that revels in physical dissection of
works may still have a mature understanding of the limitations of the
merger and scones t faire doctrines with respect to visual works and will
avoid the most blatant forms of chopping and dissection. A circuit that
professes to preserve the total concept and feel of the work for an intrinsic
similarity evaluation may still have an expansive view of the applicability
of the merger and scones dfaire doctrines to visual works and will wind up
taking the case away from the finder of fact at the extrinsic similarity stage,
or through instructions given as part of a more discerning observer analysis,
or after an intrinsic comparison because the court has determined that the
only features copied are barred by merger or scones d faire under an
expansive reading of the two doctrines. Therefore, a mature understanding
of the limits or nonapplicability of the two doctrines is essential to
protecting the full potential of visual media from copying.
1. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit is as much to blame for the application of the
merger and scones d faire doctrines to visual works as it is for showing, of
late, a great deal of restraint in the application of these doctrines in the
comparison of visual works. It was the Second Circuit in Nichols that laid
2871d. at 372.
288 See Dymow v. Bolton, I 1 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926).
289 Meade, 27 Fed. CI. at 374.
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out the philosophical justification for both the merger and the scones d faire
doctrines and the abstraction test.29° It was also the Second Circuit in Altai
that added the filtration and comparison parts to the abstraction test in the
context of computer programs, and in so doing, brought the scones cd faire
doctrine to computerized visual works.291
The lower courts of the circuit, particularly the Southern District of New
York, have produced famously expansive opinions on the merger and
scones d faire doctrines.292 The Second Circuit has happily applied the
merger and scones 6 faire doctrines to lifelike toys, such as dolls in
humanoid form, and just as happily preserved the same types of dolls from
the two doctrines when it suited it to do so. 293
29 0See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
29 1 See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707-10 (2d Cir. 1992); see
also Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982),
superseded by rule in part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v.
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) (maze framework of PAC-MAN is a standard
game device and thus not copyrightable under doctrine of scenes difaire; only specific characters
used in the game are protectable).
292 See, e.g., Earth Flag Ltd. v. Alamo Flag Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353-58 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (flag depicting photograph of the Earth has no original components that entitled it to
copyright protection); Past Pluto Prods. Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435, 1440-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (no originality in foam hat designed to resemble the Statue of Liberty's crown).
293 See Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Though
the dolls' bodies are very similar, nearly all of the similarity can be attributed to the fact that both
are artist's renderings of the same unprotectable idea-a superhuman muscleman crouching in...
a traditional fighting pose."); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500-01 (2d
Cir. 1982) (finding no infringement where both plaintiff and defendant produced stuffed snowmen
of the same size with traditional snowman features); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630
F.2d 905, 915-17 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding no infringement although dolls were mechanically
identical and structurally similar, both were made of plastic and between three and four inches tall
and there was similarity as to standard doll features; mechanical aspects of dolls were not
copyrightable and "all dolls attempting to express the same idea will of necessity display at least
some similarity"); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022-23 (2d Cir. 1966) (many
features of doll faces are standard and stereotypical); Uneeda Doll Co. v. P & M Doll Co., 353
F.2d 788, 789 (2d Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (idea of doll in a display box with its arm around a red
and white striped pole is not copyrightable); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills
Fun Group, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 291, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("The defendants have no more right to a
monopoly in the theme of a black-robed, helmeted, evil figure in outer-space conflict with a
humanoid and a smaller non-humanoid robot than Shakespeare would have had in the theme of a
'riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household' and who had conflicts with 'a
foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress."' (citation omitted)); see also Mattel, Inc.
v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2004) ("There are innumerable ways of
making upturned noses, bow lips, and widely spaced eyes.").
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In Mattel v. Goldberger Doll Manufacturing Co., the court recognized
that there are an unlimited number of ways of combining standard features
of dolls depicting youthful female faces. 2 94 This means that any doll creator
can use the same stock of features (bow lips, pert noses, large, widespread
eyes) without limitation, but the doll creator cannot copy the creative and
original arrangement of those features expressed in the work of another
author. Barbie is Barbie because Mattel put together a winning
combination of stock doll features in an attractive and original way. 95
Mattel has no monopoly on pert noses, bow lips, or any other typical facial
figures of dolls, but it does have a monopoly on its original combination of
these stock features, which add up to the instantly recognizable face of a
Barbie doll.296 A competitor must make its own combination because it
cannot copy Mattel's.
297
The merger doctrine does not apply to Mattel's doll image because doll
creators are not limited in how to depict the face of a youthful female; the
scones 6 faire doctrine does not apply because there are unlimited
combinations of stock features of dolls all of which may be separately
copyrighted.298 In like manner, the Second Circuit recently held that the
merger and sc~nes d faire doctrines do not apply to original combinations
of common, unprotected elements of an on-line grocery shopping site2 99 or
to original selections and arrangements of common articles in jewelry
designs.3 °0
The present law of the Second Circuit preserves works whose features
are alleged to be subject to the merger and scones d faire doctrines from
exclusion in the subjective, intrinsic similarity portion of the substantial
similarity evaluation. 30 1 More often than not, this will allow the finder of
fact the opportunity to consider the substantiality of the similarity between
the total work of the plaintiff compared to the total work of the
294See Goldberger Doll, 365 F.3d at 135.
295 
See id.
296 Id. at 136.
2 9 7
1d"
298 See id. at 135.
299See MyWebGrocer, LLC v. Hometown Info., Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2004).
3
00See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2001).
301 See Goldberger Doll, 365 F.3d at 136-37; Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein
Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2003); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268-
72 (2d Cir. 2001).
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defendant.3 °2 The Second Circuit's rationale for employing a "total concept
and feel" test is "[that the test] functions as a reminder that, while the
infringement analysis must begin by dissecting the copyrighted work into
its component parts in order to clarify precisely what is not original,
infringement analysis is not simply a matter of ascertaining similarity
between components viewed in isolation.,
303
For example, in Boisson, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant copied
two of her registered quilt designs.304 The court first looked to whether the
plaintiff owned a valid copyright and determined that she did.30 5 Next, the
court concluded that the defendant actually did copy plaintiffs work.3 06
But because pure copying does not establish infringement, the plaintiffs still
must show "'substantial similarity' between defendants' quilts and the
protectable elements of their own quilts. 30 7 Although colors in general and
the letters of the alphabet in particular are part of the public domain and the
idea of using letters of the alphabet on a quilt was an unprotectable idea, the
court held that the layout of the alphabet on plaintiffs quilt (the
arrangement, shape, combination of colors, and overall design of how the
letters would appear on the quilt) was protectable because it was an
independent creation.30 8
Having found that plaintiffs quilts were copyrightable and that the
defendant actually copied some of the elements of the quilt, the court went
on to determine if the quilts were substantially similar.30 9 The court first
looked to whether "the ordinary observer.. . would be disposed to overlook
[the disparities], and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same. '310 In
applying this test, the court applied a "total concept and feel" standard.
311
Therefore, the court compared the defendant's and the plaintiffs quilts on
302 See, e.g., Goldberger Doll, 365 F.3d at 135; Tufenkian, 338 F.3d at 133-34; Boisson, 273
F.3d at 272-73.
303 Tufenkian, 338 F.3d at 134.
3°4Boisson, 273 F.3d at 265.
3
11 See id. at 267.
306 See id.
307 
Id. at 268 (citation omitted).
"'See id. at 269-71.
309 
See id. at 271-73.




the basis of arrangement and shapes of the letters, colors chosen, quilting
patterns, and particular placement of icons.3"2
The Second Circuit devised a solution to a problem raised by the facts
of the case: Plaintiff Boisson admitted that some aspects of the quilts (the
use of alphabet letters in large blocks, on a quilt) were copied from other
sources. 313 Because some of the quilt was not original and, therefore, not
protectable, the court then applied a "more discerning [observer] test"
which is required when a plaintiff's work is not wholly original but rather
incorporates elements from the public domain.31 4 The test is not used when
there is no proof, admission, or concession in the case that plaintiff copied
certain other works and incorporated them into the work in question.31 5 For
the "more discerning observer" test, the ordinary observer must view the
work as a whole but with a more critical eye; it must discern substantial
similarity while taking into account the court's instructions that certain
parts of the plaintiffs work are not original and not to be considered.31 6
The observer must fird substantial similarity between only those elements
that are copyrightable.317 In Boisson, because the concept of using letters
from the alphabet in large blocks on a quilt was taken from the public
domain, the court determined that it had to apply a "more discerning
ordinary observer test."
318
The apparent difference between the dissection-filtration approach and
the "more discerning observer" approach is that in the latter the observer
still is to compare the works as a whole.3 19 The observer must mentally
note that if the only similarity noted is as to the unoriginal components
instructed to the observer by the court (e.g., in Boisson, if the only
similarity noted was that the two quilts each featured letters of the alphabet
in large blocks), then the observer is to return a finding of no substantial
3 'Id. at 273.
313 Id. at 269.
314See id. at 272; see also Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945
F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991).
315Boisson, 273 F.3d at 272; see also Key Publ'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d at 514.
316 See Boisson, 273 F.3d at 272.
317 See id.
318 id.
319 1d. ("[W]e have nevertheless always recognized that the [more discerning] test is guided
by comparing the 'total concept and feel' of the contested works." (citing Knitwaves, Inc. v.
Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995))).
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similarity.320 Under the dissection-filtration approach, the courts give the
impression that the observer never is to see the unoriginal parts; in the case
of a visual work, they might very well be erased, masked, cut, or whited out
of the depiction. This approach makes it extremely difficult if not
impossible to evaluate the concept and feel of the piece, let alone the total
concept, look, and feel.
The important difference between the Second Circuit and other courts
(particularly the circuits presented above) is not in the comparison test it
uses but rather in its thoughtful and circumscribed understanding of the
merger and scones ctfaire doctrines in the context of visual works. The test
used is not nearly as important. A circuit that revels in physical dissection
of works may still have an understanding of the limitations of the merger
and scones d faire doctrines with respect to visual works and will avoid the
most blatant forms of chopping and dissection. A circuit that professes to
preserve the total concept and feel of the work for an intrinsic similarity
evaluation may still have an expansive view of the applicability of the
merger and scones 6 faire doctrines to visual works and will wind up taking
the case away from the finder of fact at the extrinsic similarity stage, or
through instructions given as part of a "more discerning observer" analysis,
or after an intrinsic comparison because the court has determined that the
only features copied are barred by merger or scones di faire under an
expansive reading of the two doctrines. Therefore, an understanding of the
limits or nonapplicability of the two doctrines is essential to protecting the
full potential of visual media from copying.
In Boisson, the use of letters and the placement of letters in large blocks
were not original but the arrangement, shape, color, and design of the letters
used and all of the non-alphabetical design elements were original. 321 The
court did not filter out the alphabet letters from consideration because to do
so would deny the plaintiff recognition and protection for the original and
creative arrangement, shape, color, and design of the letters used. After a
comparison of the several quilts at issue in the case, the Second Circuit
320 Id
32 Id. at 273-74. See also Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338
F.3d 127, 129-30, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that certain elements of plaintiffs rugs
admittedly were copied from public domain sources, but the arrangement, combination, and
manipulation of those elements were original; the observer was to consider the rugs as a whole




concluded that some of the defendants' quilts were substantially similar to
plaintiff's and some were not.322
2. Third Circuit
Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc. is a
landmark Third Circuit opinion on the idea-expression dichotomy.323 The
court considered the situation of a wildlife artist who transferred the
copyright to a painting of a male and female cardinal, and later painted
another work embodying the same subject matter.324 The copyright owner
of the first painting alleged infringement.325 The court traveled the path of
the law, finding that although the subject matter or theme of the works was
an unprotectable idea, the embodiment of the idea of a naturalistic painting
of two cardinals in the two works was separately protectable.3 26 Far from
denying that the first work did not have copyright protection because it
featured an accurate and realistic rendition of factual subject matter from
the real world (the nature and appearance of cardinals), the court focused
instead on whether the second work was substantially similar to the first
work.327 The court never discussed the merger doctrine or scones 6 faire
doctrine even though the opportunity was staring it in the face-the idea of
an actual cardinal might be held to merge with every realistic depiction of
the bird, thus rendering every painting of the bird to be uncopyrightable.
On the other hand, the scones d faire doctrine might have been held to
dispel the plaintiffs claim because any realistic depiction of an actual bird
might very well have been held to be the kind of stock image or natural
theme that must be done in order to depict the bird, and thus be held
uncopyrightabie.328 Regardless of the two doctrines, the Third Circuit
32 2Boisson, 273 F.3d at 274-75.
323575 F.2d 62, 67 (3d Cir. 1978).




32 8Cf Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908-09 (3d Cir. 1975). The
court passed up the opportunity to apply the merger doctrine or scones di faire doctrine in an
earlier case involving charts designed to illustrate weight-lifting techniques. See id. Instead of
stripping the first chart of its design elements because they are merged with concepts relating to
weight-lifting or embody a scone d faire relating the use of weight machines, the court simply
evaluated the two works side-by-side for comparison of similarity. See id. The court stated:
"[W]ith respect to commercial documents... the similarity probably must be more extensive than
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approved of the submission of the two works to the finder of fact for
analysis of substantial similarity, and on appeal the court carefully weighed
the two works side by side and found an absence of similarity in several
notable features of the two works, supporting the findings below.329 The
Third Circuit concluded that it is perfectly acceptable for an artist to create
a "variation on a theme" of an earlier work without copying it even if the
two works do have obvious similarities because they depict the same
subject matter and are by the hand of the same artist.
330
Parts of Franklin Mint Corp. are still evident in Third Circuit
jurisprudence. In Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.,3 3 1 then Circuit Judge
Alito, writing for the Third Circuit sitting en banc, embraced the doctrine of
originality as established in Feist3 32 and Sarony.333 The Third Circuit
endorsed the doctrine that a mechanical process such as photography that
captures a slice of reality nonetheless reveals artistic creativity and
originality. 334 The court recognized that the subject matter of photography
may be the real world objects and places (unprotectable facts) but the artist
captures and creates an original embodiment in the form of an original work
of photographic art (protectable expression).335
The Third Circuit determined that a screw fastener manufacturer had not
achieved the requisite level of originality in the mechanical application of a
numbering system for its products.336 The assignment of numbers was
based on a scheme or process invented by Southco, but like other processes
and methods of operation, it was held to be uncopyrightable under 17
U.S.C. § 102(b).337
Circuit Judge Roth, in dissent, reminded the court that where "the same
idea can be expressed in a plurality of totally different manners, a plurality
in the case of more artistic works in order to justify a finding of substantial similarity." Id. at 908
(quoting I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 143.2 (1973)).
329 See Franklin Mint Corp., 575 F.2d at 66.
33 0
See id.
331390 F.3d 276, 281-84 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 336 (2005).
3 3 2 Id. at 281 (discussing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358-63
(1991)).
1
33 Id. at 283-84 (discussing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58-59
(1884)).
334





1 Id. at 284-85.
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of copyrights may result. 3 38  Later in the dissent, Judge Roth stated:
"While facts may not be copyrighted, original selections and arrangements
of facts are entitled to protection. Thus, with respect to the selection and
arrangement of non-copyrightable facts, 'it is almost inevitable that the
original contributions of the compilers will consist of ideas.', 3 3 9 In these
circumstances, Circuit Judge Roth points out, the merger doctrine should
not prevent the recognition of copyright for original combinations and
arrangements of unprotectable elements.34°
Although the majority and the dissent in Southco seemed to be walking
the same path for a great distance, the ultimate disagreement on the
application of Feist's originality principles reveals the trouble courts have
in recognizing the originality and copyrightability of original creations that
incorporate or compile subject matter that is arguably uncopyrightable as
ideas, processes and procedures, or stock themes and images.34' The
confusion became most obvious in other circuits in the case of
copyrightability of computer programs. The Third Circuit was one of the
pioneers of the application of originality principles to this troublesome area,
and like some pioneers, it had trouble staying on course.342
In Whelan the Third Circuit held that the non-literal structure of a
computer program represented expression, rather than an idea, and was
entitled to copyright protection. 343 Non-literal is a term used in reference to
the so-called "literal" parts of programs-the source code and object
3381 Id. at 293 n.1 1 (Roth, J., dissenting) (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983)).
339
1d. at 297 (quoting CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d
61, 70 (2d Cir. 1994)) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
34 0 d. at 293 n.ll, 297.
34 1 
Id. at 281-82, 297.
342 See generally, Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986).
343 
Id. at 1239. Whelan has been roundly criticized for its ultimate interpretation of the idea-
expression dichotomy-that everything nonessential to a computer program's function may be
interpreted as "expression" and not the "idea" of the program. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v.
Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 840, 844 (10th Cir. 1993); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992); Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807
F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987). I cite Whelan for its historical role in developing the abstraction-
filtration test as a method of separating unprotectable elements from protectable elements in
copyrightable works, not as a precedent on proper interpretation of the idea-expression dichotomy
or the abstraction-filtration test.
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code-that is coded by a programmer and thus is verbal in nature
(alphanumeric) in that it contains arabic numbers and sometimes letters and
actual words (although object code has heretofore been limited to a
sequence of l's and O's functioning as "on" and "off' commands to the
machine). 344 The non-literal parts are the design elements or applications
(the opinion discussed them as algorithms, subroutines, and modules) which
the programmer wished to achieve when she puts together the code.3 45 This
allows comparison of the audiovisual output and other user applications of
the program.346
The Third Circuit recognized that the scones 6 faire doctrine or merger
doctrine might come into play with computer programs as literary works.347
The court has limited the doctrine in two important respects. First, the
doctrine is to be applied from the perspective of the creator of the work, not
the plagiarist.348 In other words, if the creator of the computer program was
limited in her design choices by the requirements or limitations of the
programming language (there are a limited number of ways to get a task
accomplished using the programming language), or the machinery (there
are a limited number of variations that will run properly on the computer
hardware the program is being designed to run on), or by standard operating
procedures for computer programming (sound programming policies dictate
certain programming choices), then these limitations may affect how
original the choices were that were made by the programmer.349 Choices
dictated by the language, the machinery, or by standard procedures are not
original to the programmer and thus not copyrightable by the
programmer.350  The difference is that only choices dictated by the
constraints of the programming language or the machinery or standard
procedures would be subject to attack by the plagiarist who would bear the
burden of proving that elements were not original; the doctrine does not
reward the choice of the plagiarist to copy the original program under a
344 Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230-31, 1233.
3451d. at 1229-30.
34 61d. at 1230-33.
34 7 See Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 214-
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belief that most of the program must have been dictated by the
programming language or the machinery or standard procedures.
351
The Third Circuit's approach to merger is restrictive, particularly with
regard to visual works. In Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., the court
evaluated allegations of merged idea and expression in the context of a
cement-cast outdoor garden sculpture.352 The Kay Berry, Inc. sculptures
were designed to look like rocks or stones but included a flat area with an
inscription molded onto the sculpture. 353  The sculpture at issue in the
litigation bore a public domain poem, but the lettering and arrangement of
the words showed design choices regarding the font and grouping of the
lines.354  In Kay Berry, a competitor, Taylor, came out with a similar
sculpture in the same size, rectangular shape, stone-like appearance, with
the same poem arranged in the same style of font and word grouping.355 To
defend its version of the sculpture, Taylor claimed that Kay Berry's
356sculpture was uncopyrightable under the merger doctrine.
The Third Circuit stated: "Merger is rare ... and is generally found in
works with a utilitarian function. This Court has never found an instance in
which a completely aesthetic expression merged into an idea." '35 7 The court
further stated that "[a] sculptural work's creativity derives from the
combination of texture, color, size, and shape, as well as the particular verse
inscribed and the way the verse is presented.1
3 58
The court did not strip the sculpture of its characteristics under a theory
of merger or scones cdfaire. Instead the court stated:
It means nothing that these elements may not be
individually entitled to protection; "all creative works draw
on the common wellspring that is the public domain. In
351 See id. at 215-16.





316See id. at 207-08. The allegation easily could have been made under the scones h faire
doctrine in that representations of natural objects are often held to be the kind of stock images that
are alleged to be uncopyrightable under the doctrine. See, e.g., Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805,
810 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003).
35
7Kay Berry, 421 F.3d at 209. (citing Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539
(3d Cir. 1986); Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947); M.M. Bus.
Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc. 472 F.2d 1137 (6th Cir. 1973)).
358Kay Berry, 421 F.3d at 207.
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this pool are not only elemental 'raw materials,' like colors,
letters, descriptive facts, and the catalogue of standard
geometric forms, but also earlier works of art that, due to
the passage of time or for other reasons, are no longer
copyright protected.,
35 9
The court continued: "When an author combines these elements and
adds his or her own imaginative spark, creation occurs, and the author is
entitled to protection for the result. '360 The court directly analogized the
situation with Kay Berry's sculpture to two situations: that of a magazine
cover design and to three-dimensional costume nose masks.361 With regard
to the former, the Third Circuit stated that "although no element of [a]
magazine cover-ordinary lines, typefaces, and colors-is entitled to
copyright protection, the distinctive arrangement is entitled to protection as
a graphic work. 3 62 With regard to the latter, the court found that sculptural
renderings of animal noses were original, copyrightable creations even
though they embodied realistic elements of actual living creatures and
anyone setting out to make a realistic sculpture of an animal nose would be
bound to turn to the same source material: actual animals.363 The court
stated:
By holding that Masquerade's nose masks are
copyrightable, we do not intimate that [Masquerade] has
the exclusive right to make nose masks representing pig,
elephant and parrot noses. On remand, it will be
Masquerade's burden to show that Unique's nose masks
incorporate copies, in the copyright law sense, of
Masquerade's sculptures, rather than sculptures that derive
their similarity to Masquerade's sculptures merely from the
commonality of the animal subjects both represent.
359Id. (citing Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132
(2d Cir. 2003)).
360Id. (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)).
3611d. at 207, 209.
362 1d. at 207 (citing Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800,
806 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
36 3See id. at 209 (discussing Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc. 912 F.2d 663,
666, 671-72 (3d Cir. 1990)).
364 Id. (citing Masquerade Novelty, 912 F.2d at 671-72).
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The difference is that the court will not strip the sculptures down to
nothing by subtracting out individual parts or characteristics embodied in
the works that relate to the idea of real objects or creatures, and
subsequently take the case away from the finder of fact on summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law or directed verdict because the
majority of parts or characteristics embodied in the work do relate to real
world objects.365 Instead, the Third Circuit will allow the plaintiff to prove
and the finder of fact to consider whether, "as a whole, 366 the unique
expression of the first creator's combination and arrangement of the
elements has been copied or whether the similarities between the works are
solely attributable to the two works' unavoidable expression of the non-
copyrightable and non-original innate characteristics of real world
objects.367
3. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit's law on merger and scones 6faire is comparatively
undeveloped. That is to say, research does not reveal an opinion of the
court discussing these two doctrines by name; however, the underlying
concepts of each doctrine (originality, idea-expression dichotomy) have
been analyzed in Fourth Circuit cases, 368 and to the extent a pattern emerges
it is in favor of a circumscribed application of the merger and scones afaire
doctrines with regard to visual works.369
Evidence of the rejection of an expansive approach to the merger and
scones t faire doctrines is seen, perhaps ironically, in Superior Form
Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., a case involving
365
1Id. at 208-10.
366,, As a whole" refers to the total concept and feel test which is accepted and applied in the
Third Circuit. See. e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234
(3d Cir. 1986); Damiano v. Sony Music Entn't, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 623, 631 (D.N.J. 1996).
367Kay Berry, 421 F.3d at 208.
368 E.g., United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1465
(4th Cir. 1997); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488,
492 (4th Cir. 1996); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986).
369E.g., Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1996) (using a total concept and feel
evaluation in testing the similarity of two motion picture treatments); Dawson v. Hinshaw Music
Inc., 905 F.2d 731,733-34 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing the use of the ordinary observer's
evaluation of total concept and feel as part of the intrinsic similarity test). See also Comins v.
Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521 (D. Md. 2002) (applying a total concept and
feel evaluation in comparing two films).
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taxidermy models. 370 The court evaluated the originality of models formed
in part from actual carcasses of animals.371 The representation of actual
living creatures, particularly in three-dimensional forms with lifelike size
and postures, presents a classic situation to interpret the meaning of the
idea-expression dichotomy and the breadth of the merger and scones dfaire
doctrine whether or not these doctrines are discussed by name. The Ninth
Circuit, following Satava, would make short work of this issue: There is
practically no way that an artist can make a lifelike representation of a
living creature and hope to defend it from a plagiarist who copies the work
and subsequently produces a lifelike representation of the same creature.372
The Fourth Circuit did not take the bait. The court did not dissect the
creature into its parts-the result of this process inevitably would be to find
an overwhelming number of features that are common to animals in real life
as well as to the plagiarist's work.373 Therefore, they might be stricken
from consideration at any stage of the evaluation, and the court should deny
plaintiffs' preliminary injunctions and grant summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, as the court
indicated in Satava.3 74 Instead, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that even
with lifelike representations, the representation of the animal contains
artistic choices and creative input that exceeds the simple idea of the animal
itself: "Several sculptors may copy a deer, even the same deer, in creating a
sculpture, and each may obtain copyright protection for his or her own
expression of the original. Such individual creative efforts inevitably
possess some degree of originality. '375 The animal's body is the fact, the
idea of the equation; the artist's work is the portrayal, the expression of the
idea.376 And a portrayal as with other expressions of ideas is protectable
under copyright.3 77
37074 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996).
37'Id. at 492-95.
372 Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811-13 (9th Cir. 2003).
373 1d. at 812-13.
3 74
See Superior Form Builders, Inc., 74 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir. 1996).
3751d. (citing Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987)).
376 See id. at 492, 494.
377 Id. at 494-495.
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4. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has avoided the path of applying the doctrines of
merger and scones d faire through a dissection method.378 It also has not
adopted the abstraction-filtration test.379  The court has made a more
thoughtful application of the two doctrines than many circuits.
The circuit's rejection of the dissection method and its limited
application of the merger and scones difaire doctrines started fairly early in,
of all things, a computer program case. In Atari, Inc. v. North American
Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., the court examined the idea-
expression dichotomy in the context of video games to determine which
elements of the Pac-Man video game were expression, subject to protection,
rather than ideas which are in the public domain. 380 The court rejected the
dissection of the subject matter into copyrighted and unprotected elements
in favor of examining the "total concept and feel" of the copyrighted
work.3 8' The court cautioned that while such dissection was not
appropriate, the substantial similarity inquiry "must take into account that
the copyright laws preclude appropriation of only those elements of the
work that are protected by the copyright., 38 2 The reason dissection is
inappropriate is that the substantial similarity inquiry is conducted from the
perspective of the "ordinary observer, [who] unless he set out to detect the
disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic
appeal as the same. 383 In other words, an ordinary observer is going to
compare the two works in their entirety for both similarities and
differences, rather than compare an incomplete, dissected version of the
original work to the allegedly infringing work. The Seventh Circuit
therefore applies a "total concept and feel" analysis test which "does not
378See e.g., Gentieu v. Tony Stone Images/Chicago, Inc. 255 F. Supp. 2d 838, 848 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (citing Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir.
1982), superseded by rule in part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v.
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985)).
37
9See Nash v CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the abstraction-
filtration test).
380672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), superseded by rule in part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as
recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985)





1d. (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960)).
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involve 'analytic dissection and expert testimony,' 384 but depends on
whether the accused work has captured the 'total concept and feel' of the
copyrighted work.
3 85
The total concept and feel test (sometimes phrased as the total look and
feel test) does not ignore unprotected elements. The Seventh Circuit admits
that, "[i]t is an axiom of copyright law that the protection granted to a
copyrightable work extends only to the particular expression of an idea and
never to the idea itself., 386 Thus, "if the only similarity between plaintiff's
and defendant's works is that of the abstract idea, there is an absence of
substantial similarity and hence no infringement results. 387  The court
stated: "When the alleged infringing work is not a duplicate of the
copyrighted work, a determination of whether protected elements have been
taken requires a close analysis of the differences and similarities between
the two works. 388 In other words, a defendant still will be able to defend
the charge of infringement by pointing out that the only factors of similarity
are unprotectable factors.
The difference in approach is obvious in cases involving creative visual
media. The "no dissection-total concept and feel" test was applied to
greeting cards in Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 38 9 to three-dimensional
stuffed animal heads and tails affixed to duffle bags in Wildlife Express
Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc.,39° and to a doll's head and facial design
in Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries.391 The difference is
that the finder of fact (or the court, at the motion stage) is predisposed to
evaluating similarities between the original and the allegedly infringing
work, not to eliminate elements of the original work before attempting to
compare the works. In this manner, obvious similarities between the
complete original and the alleged copy will stand out. For example, in
Roulo, the court might have looked at the copied elements of the plaintiffs
greeting card (striping, font, paper color, font color, size of the card, single-
384Id. (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946)).
385 Id. (citing Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)).
386 Id. at 615 (quoting Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.
1976)).
38 7
Id. (citing 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMERON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(A)(1) (1981)).
388 Id. at 614 n.6 (quoting EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION
OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 665 (2d ed. 1979)).
389886 F.2d 931, 939 (7th Cir. 1989).
3o 18 F.3d 502, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1994).
31'272 F.3d 441,451 (7th Cir. 2001).
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sided format) as unoriginal stock and trade of the greeting card genre and
eliminated them from consideration. Instead, the court noted, "While it is
true that these elements are not individually capable of protection, just as
individual words do not deserve copyright protection, it is the unique
combination of these common elements which form the copyrighted
material. 392 Under the total concept and feel evaluation, the court found:
[Defendant Berrie's] TY cards not only used the same
unprotectable elements as [plaintiffs] FS cards, but also
used them in a format nearly identical to that used by the
FS cards. It cannot be disputed that Berrie could have
produced a non-infringing card with colored stripes, but
Berrie used similar stripes flanking the verse on both the
left and right side from top to bottom just as the FS cards
did. The color of paper is unprotected, yet the TY cards are
printed on a nearly identical beige paper. The use of cursive
writing is also a common element as well as the brown ink
used, yet TY cards, out of the entire range of colors and
handwritings available, chose brown ink and a similar
cursive writing. The minute differences which Berrie
painstakingly incorporated to prevent a mirror image copy
of FS cards are insignificant in light of the nearly identical
composition and appearance used in both card lines.393
The same is true for the animal heads and tails in Wildlife Export,394 the
doll head and facial design in Susan Wakeen, 395 the flatulence-producing
392Roulo, 886 F.2d at 939.
3 9 3 
Id. at 940.
114 18 F.3dat 510-11. The court stated that:
Upon consideration of the overall look and character of the duffle bags, or their 'total
concept and feel,' ... we see a remarkable resemblance between Wildlife's and Carol
Wright's works. They are very similar in size, shape, pose, and feel. We note some
dissimilarities in the color and type of plush fur, the animals' eyes and noses; the trunk
and the ears of the elephants also differ slightly. However, such variations are, no doubt
to some extent, factors of the products available to each company and perhaps of slight
adaptations in the patterns. These differences are of minor importance in the overall
artistic expression of the entire animal faces and tails under review, and, consequently,
they do not preclude a finding of infringement under the ordinary observer test.
Id.
'9'272 F.3d at 451-52.
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" pull my finger" toy in JCW Investments, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc. ,396 and the
picture frames in Stanislawski v. Jordan.
397
The "no dissection-total concept and feel" test limits the power of the
merger doctrine and scnes d faire doctrine in other copyright originality
situations. 39  Even in Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., a case
presenting a pure Baker v. Selden situation involving a computer program,
the Seventh Circuit panel did not set out on a path to eliminate elements;
instead, the court applied the merger and scnes d faire doctrines in a more
circumscribed way.399 The alleged plagiarist in Bucklew claimed that a
program designed to collect and report HUD data in a tabular format was
uncopyrightable under either the merger or the scnes d faire doctrines. 40o
The court recognized the functional nature of the computer program, but
pointed out that:
If Bucklew [the original author] were claiming copyright in
the tabular presentation of the summary data required by-
HUD, this case would be governed by Baker v. Selden. But
he is not. He is claiming copyright in tables configured in
an optional way, tables that are the product of format
choices that are not unavoidable, for which indeed there
were an immense number of alternative combinations any
one of which HAB [the plagiarist] was free to use in lieu of
Bucklew's.
40 1
With regard to the scnes dfaire doctrine, the court further explained:
Every expressive work can be decomposed into elements
not themselves copyrightable-the cars in a car chase, the
kiss in a love scene, the dive bombers in a movie about
Pearl Harbor, or for that matter the letters of the alphabet in
any written work. The presence of such elements obviously
does not forfeit copyright protection of the work as a
whole, but infringement cannot be found on the basis of
such elements alone; it is the combination of elements, or
396289 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
397337 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1115 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
398 See, e.g., Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929-30 (7th Cir. 2003).






particular novel twists given to them, that supply the
minimal originality required for copyright protection.4 °2
Ultimately, the court preserved the work from the attack of the merger
and scones 6faire doctrines, stating:
[Merged and scones d faire elements] are at the opposite
extreme from the arbitrary details, such as the pattern of
boldfacing in Bucklew's form 52566, that contribute such
originality as a new expressive work may have. The format
choices that Bucklew made were not generic. It is not as if
everyone who writes programs of this sort uses Swiss font
or displays an output range or uses a particular pattern of
boldfacing.4 °3
The pattern of boldfacing, choice of font, and inclusion of a superfluous
output range found in both works were held instead to be evidence of direct
copying of Bucklew's work by HAB.4°
In Gaiman v. McFarlane, the court again evaluated the merger and
scones ai faire doctrines, this time in the unusual posture of cartoon artist
Todd McFarlane's claim that his own works were not original enough to be
copyrighted in order to escape the charge of plaintiff-appellant Neil Gaiman
that he was the co-author of a copyrightable work by McFarlane. °5 In the
analysis, the court indicated that under the merger and scones di faire
doctrines, there is a "difference between literary and graphic expression.
40 6
A medieval knight might be a stock character and the typical verbal
description of a medieval knight in armor carrying a shield may be a public
domain concept, but the rendering of such a knight in a graphic medium
certainly produces a copyrightable work.407 There is no standard public
domain image of a knight that must be copied by original creator and
plagiarist alike in order to communicate the graphic expression of the
concept of a medieval knight. 4
08
402Id. at 929.
4°3 Id. at 929-30.
4°4See id. at 927-30.
405360 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2004).
40d. at 660.
4°TSee id. at 661.
4°' See id. at 660-61.
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Nevertheless, vigilant repetition of the creed of "no dissection" is
necessary to avoid backsliding because the temptation always is present. A
recent opinion of the Seventh Circuit indicates the length of time that
passed since Atari v. North American Philips, and in the analysis of video
games the court no longer seems enamored of the "total concept and feel"
of the genre.4 °9 In Incredible Technologies, the Seventh Circuit panel
appeared eager to cancel out merger and scones d faire elements from a
computer golf simulation program.410  Ignoring the plain and abundant
evidence of actual copying in the case wherein the plagiarist admitted that
its goal was to create a golf simulation game so similar to the plaintiffs
game that it could be played without any substantial learning curve, the
court instead set off on a course to see how much of the original game it
could eliminate from the protection of copyright by application of the
merger and scones dz faire doctrines.41' With regard to design elements,
even visual elements, the court was unimpressed with Incredible
Technologies' (IT) visualization of a game of golf recreated through
digitalized visual media.41 2 "Even if there are multiple methods by which
an operation can be performed, a plaintiffs choice of a particular method of
operation is not eligible for protection. ' 413 The court accepted all of the
plagiarist's suggestions that:
[M]any elements of the video display were common to the
game of golf. For instance, the wind meter and club
selection features were found to account for variables in
real golf and so were indispensable to an accurate video
representation of the game. Furthermore, the court said
that the game selection features, such as the menu screens
which indicate the number of players and other variables of
the game, are common to the video-game format.414
The court failed to recognize that while elements of golf such as club
selection may be part of any golf game, the particular embodiment of that
concept can be protected from direct copying.415 It was simpler for the
40
9 See generally Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2005).




4 31d. at 1012 (citing Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995)).
4141d. at 1014.
415Id. at 1015 (discussing the lack of protection for video game presentation of standard
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court to avoid aesthetic comparisons of the two games and avoid having to
instruct the jury on making aesthetic comparisons of the games under the
guise of an application of the merger and scones a faire doctrines.416
5. Eighth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has a firm
grip on the merger and scones d faire doctrines.417 Dissection is not
allowed to prevent the ordinary observer from evaluating the total concept
and look and feel of the complete works of the original creator and of the
alleged plagiarist.
418
Perhaps the simplest way to characterize the Eighth Circuit test is to
consider that the court does not eliminate the possibility of merger and
scones d faire elements just as the court does not reject the originality
requirement and the idea-expression dichotomy codified in 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) and discussed in Feist.419 Rather, the court treats the two step
extrinsic similarity and intrinsic similarity test as being a two-part test with
two independent steps, not a test in which one step (intrinsic) is dependent
on a favorable finding on the other step (extrinsic). 420 They are steps of a
test, not elements of a claim or defense. An allegation of merged elements
or the presence of scones i faire elements in the first test will not prevent
the court from allowing the finder of fact to consider the second test unless
a reasonable ordinary observer could find no similarity in the total concept
and look and feel of the two works in the intrinsic analysis, and the only
alleged similarity is in common stock elements or a common idea or theme
behind the works in the extrinsic analysis.421
elements of golf).
4 161d. at 1011 (questioning the usefulness of the "ordinary observer" test as a lay person
might not appreciate the idea-expression dichotomy).
417See Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 315 F.3d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 2003);
Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120-21 (8th Cir. 1987); Hoch v. Mastercard Int'l
Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1223 (D. Minn. 2003).
4 18E.g., Hartman, 833 F.2d at 120 (analytical dissection is not called for under the second
step in which the response of the ordinary, reasonable person measures the expression).
419Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991). See also Taylor, 315
F.3d at 1042-43 (discussing idea-expression dichotomy and applicability of the merger and scines
dfaire doctrines); Hartman, 833 F.2d at 120-21; Hoch, 284 F. Supp. at 1222-23.
420 See, e.g., Hartman, 833 F.2d at 120.
421E.g., Hoch, 284 F. Supp. at 1222-23 (noting that summary judgment was appropriate
because no ordinary observer would think total concept and feel of documentary to save
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The doctrines of merger and scones dt faire are circumscribed in the
Eighth Circuit, particularly in the case of visual works. Courts in the Eighth
Circuit have found the doctrines inapplicable to greeting cards4 22 and quilt
designs,423 because of the multiple (if not infinite) number of ways that
component parts or common ideas can be expressed visually.424 But if the
intrinsic similarity is lacking, a copyright owner cannot fall back on
common public domain elements of the work (similar ideas, similar themes)
and make a list of similar features if those features would qualify as merged
or scones dfaire elements.425 Thus, the balance between the realm of ideas
and realm of expressions is preserved.
6. District of Columbia Circuit
Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates reveals the District of Columbia
Circuit's approach to the merger and scones t faire doctrines in cases
involving visual works.426 Sturdza was an architect that brought suit against
another architect, Demetriou, for copyright infringement on Sturdza's
design for the United Arab Emirates' new embassy.427  In the case, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) held a competition for the architectural design
of a new embassy and chancery building that it planned to construct in
Washington, D.C.428 The UAE provided a Program Manual that detailed
the requirements for various aspects of the design.429  Sturdza and
Demetriou both submitted designs, and a board of architects and civil
engineers chose Sturdza's design; the UAE notified Sturdza of her win.43 °
The UAE began negotiations with Sturdza, but stopped communicating
Minnesota Twins was similar to Mastercard campaign regarding string of ballpark visits on the
intrinsic analysis, and any similarities were attributable only to common idea behind the works of
a roadtrip to visit baseball stadiums and scones ifaire elements associated with expression of idea
of ballpark visits in the extrinsic analysis).
422 Taylor, 315 F.3d at 1042-43.
423Thimbleberries, Inc. v. C & F Enters., Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1138 (D. Minn. 2001).
424 Taylor, 315 F.3d at 1043; Thimbleberries, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
421Hartman, 833 F.2d at 121 (determining that the only similar features were
noncopyrightable ideas or scones hifaire); Hoch, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
426281 F.3d 1287, 1295-97 (D.C. Cir. 2002).




430 Id. at 1292.
BAYLOR LA WREVIEW
with her without signing a contract proposal. 431 A year later, Sturdza
learned that the UAE had presented an embassy design to the National
Capital Planning Commission.432 The design belonged to Demetriou, and
he had allegedly "copied and appropriated many of the design features that
had been the hallmark of her [Sturdza's] design. 4 33 The court stated that
"[t]he substantial similarity determination requires comparison not only of
the two works' individual elements in isolation, but also of their 'overall
look and feel. ' , 4 34 In other words, "[t]he touchstone of the analysis is the
overall similarities rather than the minute differences between the two
works., 435 The court strove to apply a total look and feel analysis because
"protectable expression may arise through the ways in which artists
combine even unprotectable elements.
4 36
In applying the total look and feel concept to Sturdza's and Demetriou's
designs, the court said: "The size, shape, and placement of Demetriou's
wind-towers, parapets, and pointed domes, when viewed from the front,
give his building a contour virtually identical to Sturdza's.,,437 Furthermore,
the court looked at the similarities between the two buildings and stated:
[B]oth buildings have a pyramid-like clustering of pointed
arches around the front entrances, prominent horizontal
bands and vertical columns demarcating the windows,
slightly protruding midsections, diamond grids, and similar
latticework patterning inside the arches. Finally,
Demetriou achieves the "Islamic" effect sought by the UAE
by expressing and combing his wind-towers, arches, dome,
parapet, and decorative patterning in ways quite similar to
Sturdza's expression and combination of these elements.438
The court concluded that despite differences between Demtriou's and
Sturdza's designs, and despite the incorporation of various scones di faire




434Id. at 1296 (citing Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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patterns),43 9 Demetriou's design was substantially similar to Sturdza's
because the differences were too minute to take away from the total look
and feel of Sturdza's design.
440
The District of Columbia Circuit's restricted view of the merger and
scones d faire doctrines is further revealed in the computer program case of
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman.441 Instead of following the well traveled path
of automatically excluding elements of video games as merged ideas or
stock images (paddles, walls, geometric shapes, colors), the court carefully
considered the effect of Feist and its holding that combinations of
unprotected elements may yet be arranged in an original way and receive
copyright protection." 2 The court noted that the acclaimed artistic works of
Mondrian and Malevich were combinations and arrangements of geometric
shapes and lines in various colors.443 The District of Columbia Circuit
reaffirmed its holding in Reader's Digest Association, Inc. v. Conservative
Digest, Inc. when it held that layout and typeface elements, although
obviously public domain elements, can be combined in a creative and
distinctive composite that is copyrightable and protectable from a
substantially similar composite put forth by an alleged plagiarist. 4" In
Atari II, the court held that the bricks, rectangular "paddle," side to side
motion, and rebounding motion of the ball that were found in plaintiffs
BREAKOUT game were part of an original and distinctive whole, even
though each part might be common to other video games and thus arguably
subject to the merger, scones dfaire, or functionality originality defenses.
445
The court remanded the case twice with instructions for the district court
and the Register of Copyrights that the creative combination of unprotected
game elements should receive copyright status and subsequent protection
from substantially similar infringing games." 6
4391d. at 1297.
440 Id. at 1299.
441 See generally 979 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Atari II), appeal after remand from 888 F.2d
878 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Atari I).
"2 Id. at 244-45.
443See id. at 243 n. 1. The court also posited the rhetorical question: "If Picasso had painted a
round object on a canvas, would you say because it depicts a familiar subject-namely, something
that's round-it can't be copyrighted?" Id. (citing OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346,
348 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
"4Id. (citing Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 806
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).
445 Id. at 246-47.
446Id. at 247; Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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IV. REJECTION OF THE MERGER DOCTRINE AND SCANES4j FAIRE
DOCTRINE FOR VISUAL WORKS
Is the substantial similarity test inherently wrong? Are the merger and
scones 6 faire doctrines simply bad law? The answer to both questions is
no. The problem is not the existence of the merger and scones 6 faire
doctrines. These doctrines are supported by 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) and the
concept of the idea-expression dichotomy discussed and clarified in
Feist.447  Ideas cannot be copyrighted. 448 If there is only one way to
express an idea, the idea and expression merge and the expression cannot be
copyrighted. 449 Public domain elements of literary works such as standard
themes, stock plot devices, standard character types, and cliched phrases
cannot be appropriated by any author.450 This is a great blessing in literary
works: No one can capture words or phrases or settings or genres by
simply being the first to write them down.
The merger and scones 6 faire doctrines are a great curse in visual art
settings because their application rests on a fallacy: That an idea of a visual
work and the expression of the idea can merge, or that artists must copy a
standard image in order to depict an idea.45' No one captures an idea by
being the first to depict it visually. There is never a single way to depict
some thing visually--object, creature, or idea. Another depiction is always
possible. The presumption behind the application of the merger doctrine to
visual works is that if we grant the creator full recognition for her original
depiction and original combinations of unprotected elements this will
somehow limit the creative potential of the next artist to try her hand at
depicting the idea of the scene.45 2 There is no such limitation except that
which is within the mind of the second artist who cannot conceive of a
different way of depicting the idea and resorts to plagiarism out of
frustration for lack of creativity.
The presumption behind the application of the scones cifaire doctrine to
visual works is that the original author was forced to choose from a
drastically limited number of images to copy in order to properly or
447Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
448Id.
449Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2005).
4 50E.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 535 (6th Cir.
2004) (citing Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993)).
451Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2003).
452 See id. at 812.
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efficiently depict the idea, and we cannot blame the plagiarist for also
copying one of the images (namely, the original author's). 453 If that is true,
courts should require the defendant to prove which stock image the original
author copied to state a prima face case for the application of the scones d
faire doctrine as an affirmative defense. Of course, in most cases this will
be impossible; most plaintiffs did not copy a prior image, which is what
made their original art so attractive for the plagiarist to copy. If the plaintiff
did copy another image, her copyright claim would be subject to attack for
lack of originality defeating her entire copyright over the work in
question.454
There are three distinct problems with an expansive application of the
merger and scones di faire doctrines to visual works. First, the merger and
scones 6 faire doctrines were created to protect the public domain from
excessively broad enforcement of literary works whose scope extends to
abstractions of the work beyond its actual words so that a plagiarist cannot
get away with stealing simply by avoiding the literal455 or actual copying of
the original author's words.4 56 Infringement of visual works is much more
often based on a claim of literal or actual copying; no abstraction of the
work is required, and, therefore, there is no need to circumscribe the scope
of plaintiffs work to protect the public domain from an expansive
protection of abstractions of plaintiffs work. Second, courts applying the
merger and scones t faire doctrines expansively often reveal an inability to
understand or appreciate the creative opportunities to express and portray
objects visually and to identify and appreciate the contributions of the artist
to the work above and beyond the simple ideas behind the works; this
453 See id.
454 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that
originality is required for a copyright).
455i hesitate to use the word "literal" (as in "literal copying") with respect to visual works
because the term is derived from the same root as "literary" and thus is an apt term to describe
word-for-word copying of verbal works and not the copying of visual works. The term "actual
copying" used by some courts is not nearly as effective a term because works are "actually"
copied by many means other than word-for-word reproduction or photo-mechanical duplication of
visual works. My intention is to describe direct copying of the actual content of visual works, but
not necessarily limited to photo-mechanical means such as photographing, photocopying, or
scanning. Copying the actual content of a visual work by hand still is direct copying of the
content of the work; it is not simply copying an abstraction of the work. To communicate this
concept I will use the terms "literal" or "actual copying" as these are the terms the courts use, with
apologies to my readers for perpetuating any confusion over these terms.
456See e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
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causes the courts to discount creative combinations and additions to works
that have connections to preexisting objects and prior works.457 Third, far
from exercising humility out of their ignorance, courts are unwilling to
allow jurors to take on the burden and make an analysis of the total concept
and look and feel of the works at issue.458 Instead, courts apparently want
to avoid aesthetic determinations altogether by creating the opportunity
(through the dissection and filtration tests) to eliminate parts of the original
work until it is reduced to such a small sum of parts that it appears as a
matter of law that there is not a substantial enough amount of overlap
between the two works for a finding that defendant inappropriately copied
plaintiff's work.459 Often this is done in the face of obvious or even
admitted copying of the creative, original components of the visual work by
the defendant.
A. Allegations of Literal or Actual Copying Defeat the Need for the
Application of the Merger and Scenes A Faire Doctrines
Copying is the primary activity that a copyright prevents. 460 The subtle
flaw in the logic of the application of the merger doctrine and scones dfaire
doctrines to visual works is that the concepts of merger and scones d faire
attempt to demonstrate that the defendant need not have copied plaintiffs
work in order to produce her own because the idea behind the two works or
the nature and genre of the works dictate the embodiment of the idea in a
single or a severely limited number of ways.461 The theory is that the
original creator was limited by these same forces, so who can blame the
defendant for being coerced by these forces into creating her work in a way
that shares similarities with the plaintiffs work. This is true in literary
settings.462 It is not true in visual settings.
In literary settings, if you want to express the idea of darkness, you have
to use the word "dark" or one of a limited number of synonyms of that
457Satava, 323 F.3d at 811.
458 See e.g., Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.
2005) (questioning the usefulness of an "ordinary observer" test).
459 Id. at 1010-1012, 1014-1015.
461 intend no insult to the importance of the other rights granted in 17 U.S.C. § 106, but
prevention of unauthorized copying is the most important right protected by the copyright laws.
461See Satava, 323 F.3d at 811-12 (stating that ideas provided by nature are not subject to
copyright and even original contributions were only narrowly protected).
462 Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003).
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word. No one can stop the next author from "copying" the word dark in
order to express the idea of darkness. The first author was as limited by the
available means provided by the English language in expressing the idea of
darkness in writing as the second author was. If a dark and rainy night is
the concept an author wishes to express, no one can accuse that author of
copying the words "dark and rainy night" to express that concept. The
words are necessary or at least the most efficient way to express the
concept. If standing under a streetlight while the rain pours down your
neck on a dark and rainy night is the idea the author wishes to express, he or
she is able to use most if not all of these words to express it. This is the
meaning of merger: The idea and the expression merge when there is only
one way or practically only a very limited number ways of expressing the
concept.463
The concept of scones di faire works a similar protection in literary
works. A genre cannot be captured by being the first to write in it
(mysteries, crime stories, romance novels, coming-of-age stories, buddies-
on-a-roadtrip stories).46  Character types cannot be protected simply by
describing the type (a lazy husband, a wise old man, a jealous or desperate
housewife).465 Settings cannot be monopolized simply by working them
into your writing (a sleazy dive, a brightly lit restaurant, Red Square in
Moscow, Fifth Avenue in Manhattan between 57th and 59th Streets).466 If
another person wanted to put a scene on Red Square they would have to use
the words "Red Square" and when they describe it they no doubt will use
similar words as previous authors have used because they have to use those
words, not because they have to copy another author's description of the
scene.
Literary works, including for the most part motion pictures, enjoy the
freedom preserved by the merger and scones d faire doctrines because in
most disputes the fight is not over overt, word-for-word copying of text or
actual taping and reproduction of segments of film or television or video.
In no case involving books or screenplays or motion pictures or television
cited in this Article was the issue that the defendant actually copied the
words of the plaintiff or taped and reproduced a segment of the plaintiff's
audiovisual work; these scenarios come up in other copyright disputes over
463 Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2005).
464See Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).
465 See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that
drunks, prostitutes, and policemen would be in any realistic work about the South Bronx).
466Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1248 (11 th Cir. 1999).
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ownership or fair use. Copyright law expands the protected expression of
the author beyond the simple arrangement of words on the page or text on
the screenplay to cover creative elements of plot, specific scenes, and
specific characters created by the author.467 Thus, one cannot duplicate the
original plot, original characters, and original storyline of a literary work
and escape liability just by changing the wording. The merger doctrine and
scones d faire doctrine both work to make sure an author does not
monopolize the general themes and settings and stereotypical character
types when a second author sets off to plow the same ground.
The scope of the plaintiffs literary work extends beyond the words to a
reasonable and limited number of abstractions of the work encompassing
the original plot, original characters, and original storyline of the work.4 68
As described by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols, there is no way to predict
exactly how many levels of abstraction can or should be protected regarding
an individual work.46 9 Some works may be so creative and original that
many levels of abstraction will still contain protected original expression
that should not be freely copied by a later plagiarist.
None of this has any relevance to visual works. There are no stock
images existing in some Platonic realm of ideas that must be copied in order
to communicate the ideas. Abstraction is not necessary because it is literal
or actual copying that is the subject of plaintiff's complaint. It is true that at
a certain level of abstraction, some images will share common features with
other images. If a person sets out to portray a flag, most will arrive with a
pole and a rectangular piece of fabric that is curved slightly to reveal its
flexible, flag-like nature. If a person sets out to portray an American flag,
the same rectangular piece of fabric on the pole will have red, white, and
blue coloring on it. That is it; there is no singular image necessary to copy
to communicate flag, unlike in a literary sense in which a limited number of
words (i.e., flag, American, United States, U.S.A.) necessarily must be used
to communicate the same concept.
The vast majority of copyright actions about visual media concern
literal or actual copying. As an artist, I can tell you from experience that it
is monumentally unusual for an artist depicting the same subject as another
artist to come up with a substantially similar work as the other artist unless
she copies the work of the other. Monet and Renoir stood side by side
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painting bathers at La Grenouillere (the "Frog Pond") and practicing the
principles of Impressionism, the school of art that they founded, yet each
produced a singular, original work indicative only in the one case of
Monet's hands470 and in the other of Renoir's hands. 471 However, if one
copied the other's work, the similarity might have been staggering.
B. Judges Reveal an Ignorance of Creative, Original Artistic
Combinations and Additions to Works Through an Expansive
Application of the Merger and Scenes A Faire Doctrines
There is a simple explanation for the many unusual outcomes of visual
art cases in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits:
Courts fail to understand or appreciate the creative opportunities to express
and portray objects visually and to identify and appreciate the contributions
of the artist to the work above and beyond the simple ideas behind the
works. This causes the courts to discount creative combinations and
additions to works that portray objects and scenes from the real world or
472contain original combinations of unoriginal elements. Justice OliverWendell Holmes predicted this problem when he stated:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It
may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the
etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have
been sure of protection when seen for the first time ....
That these pictures had their worth and their success is
470See http://p.giroud.free.fr/monet/grenouillere.jpg (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
471 See http://www.lannaronca.it/Renoir/La%20Grenouillere.jpg (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
472 See, e.g., Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810-13 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the difficulty




sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them without
regard to the plaintiffs' rights.473
Justice Holmes was addressing many courts' failure to appreciate the
originality and creativity of certain visual works in the initial
copyrightability analysis. The same failure occurs when the courts do not
recognize the creative combinations and additions to visual works that
allow the works to surpass the common, public domain ideas of the subject
matter of the works. At the one extreme is the Ninth Circuit's declaration
that it is virtually impossible to render a lifelike artistic depiction of a living
creature with enough originality to preclude a plagiarist from making a
patently similar copy of the first work.474 The holding of the Ninth Circuit
in Satava cannot be reconciled with the holding of the Third Circuit in
Franklin Mint475 and Masquerade Novelty,476 the Fourth Circuit in Superior
Form Builders,477 the Seventh Circuit in Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol
Wright Sales, Inc.,478 and the Ninth Circuit itself in Kamar International.
479
At another extreme is Yankee Candle, in which the First Circuit held that
creative combinations of common, unoriginal photographic elements cannot
add up to a protectable, original whole. 480  These cases are in direct
contradiction of the holding of Feist,481 as well as the holdings of dozens of
other circuit court cases that have protected the rights of authors of works
containing creative, original, and protectable combinations of unoriginal
components.4 2 If anything, this split in the circuits should counsel judges
to avoid a rash determination that there are no protectable creative elements
4 73 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (citing Henderson
v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758, 765 (C.C. Mass. 1894)).
474 Satava, 323 F.3d at 810-13.
475 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1978).
476Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 671-72 (3d Cir. 1990).
477 Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 492 (4th
Cir. 1996).
4 7 8
8ee generally 18 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 1994).
479 See generally Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981).
480See generally Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d. 25 (1st Cir. 2001).
481 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
482E.g., Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003);
Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 135-136 (2d Cir.
2003); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 273 (2d Cir. 2001); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman,
979 F.2d 242, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 939 (7th Cir.
1989); Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 806 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
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in works that depict natural objects or contain creative combinations of
common, unoriginal elements or subject matter. Feist held that the standard
for creativity and originality is intentionally low and the vast majority of
works should make the grade quite easily.483 Yet, half of the circuits of the
United States courts of appeals have seen fit to dissect and filter out the
elements of creative visual works through an expansive application of the
merger and scones d faire doctrines, reducing the works to a pile of random
elements that no rational finder of fact can compare to an alleged
plagiarist's work in a determination of substantial similarity.
C. An Expansive Application of the Merger and Scenes A Faire
Doctrines Denies Visual Artists the Protection of the Copyright
Laws by Taking the Substantial Similarity Determination Away
From the Finder of Fact
The subtext of this discussion of the expansion in the application of the
merger and scones difaire doctrines to visual works is that many if not most
of the cases applying the doctrines through a dissection and filtration
analysis wind up determining that the case can be taken away from the jury
on summary disposition because so much of the plaintiffs work has been
dissected and filtered away that there is nothing substantial left for the
alleged plagiarist to have copied. This practice denies visual artists the
right to have the intrinsic similarity of their works and the alleged
plagiarist's works evaluated by the finder of fact.
. The Ninth Circuit shows the development of this process in Aliotti v. R.
Dakin & Co., a case involving depictions of actual creatures (albeit
dinosaurs).484 The court reconsidered the intrinsic similarity test so as to
better accommodate the merger doctrine. 85 First, the court noted:
[T]he district court's determination as to substantial
similarity of expression relied incorrectly on the analytic
dissection of the dissimilar characteristics of the dolls.
Similarity of expression exists only when 'the total concept
and feel of the works' is substantially similar. Dissection
of dissimilarities is inappropriate because it distracts a
483Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
4 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
4851d. at 901.
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reasonable observer from a comparison of the total concept
and feel of the works.4 86
The subtle insertion of the word "dissimilarities" was important because
the court was about to make a point about dissection of similarities in an
effort to open the door to the merger doctrine in visual media cases:
To the extent that it is necessary to determine whether
similarities result from unprotectable expression, it is
appropriate under Krofft's intrinsic test to perform analytic
dissection of similarities. Although even unprotectable
material should be considered when determining if there is
substantial similarity of expression, no substantial
similarity may be found under the intrinsic test where
analytic dissection demonstrates that all similarities in
expression arise from the use of common ideas.4 87
Thus, dissection entered the intrinsic portion of the similarity test, albeit
after the "total concept and feel" of the works as a whole was evaluated by
the finder of fact. 88 If there was no substantial, intrinsic similarity as to the
works as a whole, the case was closed; however, if there was substantial,
intrinsic similarity as to the works as a whole, the similar features of the
works could then be dissected and separately analyzed to make sure that all
similarities were not as to unprotected elements.
Aliotti recognized that courts that are intent on expanding the
application of the doctrine would find it hard to accomplish this in the face
of the total concept and feel standard.4 8 9  Total concept and feel is a
standard for ordinary observers, namely the jury as finder of fact in many
copyright actions. In light of this fact, courts typically pay lip service to the
proposition that the intrinsic similarity determination using the total concept
and feel standard is not proper for summary disposition.490  The total
concept and feel standard finds its support in the bedrock copyright law
stating that original combinations of uncopyrightable components can be
486 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).






See id. at 900 (stating that summary judgment is not favored in substantial similarity
cases).
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protected; 491 therefore, the evaluator must look at the total combination, not
a stripped down combination when comparing it to the alleged plagiarist's
work. By shelving the total concept and feel test, and stressing the
dissection and filtration of allegedly merged and scones dfaire material, the
court creates the opportunity for summary disposition of the suit-the more
material that is stripped away from plaintiff's work, the more comfortable
the court will be with finding as a matter of law that no average person
could find the two works to be substantially similar as to the few items
remaining in the plaintiff's work. If a court takes the total concept and feel
standard seriously it almost guarantees a jury trial unless the two works in
their entirety are simply and manifestly dissimilar. Taking away a stripped
down plaintiffs creation from the jury is an easier call than making an
aesthetic determination that an average person could not find substantial
similarity in the two works as a whole. An expansive application of the
merger and scones di faire doctrines makes this possible by providing a
rationale, albeit a misguided rationale, for dissecting and filtering out
components of plaintiff s work.
VI. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOLUTION?
The current state of the law in at least half of the circuits of the United
States courts of appeals is to apply the merger and scones d faire doctrines
to visual works in a frequent and far reaching manner. The principle result
is that the authors of creative visual compilations and depictions and
portrayals of objects and entities found in the real world are denied the full
protection of copyright promised by the originality standard of Feist.492 A
secondary result is that many copyright cases in which the plaintiff lacks
actual proof of direct copying are resolved by summary disposition as
opposed to jury trials even though the two step substantial similarity test is
supposed to contain an ordinary observer standard that is not appropriate for
summary disposition. After an expansive application of the merger or
scones d faire doctrine to a plaintiffs visual work, there often is little or
nothing to compare side-by-side with the alleged plagiarist's work which
necessitates summary judgment for the plagiarist. I offer the following
solution to the problem followed by alternative recommendations if the
solution offered is not acceptable.




A. Solution: Eliminate the Application of the Merger and Scenes A
Faire Doctrines to Visual Works
The most satisfactory solution is for courts to advance the law by
finding that the merger and scones ct faire doctrines do not apply to visual
works. The merger doctrine should not apply in situations were an idea can
be depicted in innumerable ways either through original creation or by
original combinations of otherwise unprotected elements. Visual works are
a classic example of a situation where ideas can be depicted visually in
innumerable ways which should preclude application of the merger
doctrine. Furthermore, authors of visual works on the whole do not copy a
stock image in the way that literary works adopt and express a stock scene
or situation. There is no set of images that must be copied in order to depict
the idea of the image. In the absence of proof that plaintiff did in fact copy
a preexisting stock image or "required" image, the merger and scones d
faire doctrines should not apply to visual media.
B. Recommendation: Impose a Burden on the Alleged Plagiarist to
Produce the Image Copied by the Original Artist in Order to
Trigger the Application of the Merger and Scenes d Faire
Doctrines to Visual Works
Short of overturning decades of law, the courts could interpret the
merger and scones i faire doctrines more logically and require the alleged
plagiarist to produce the image (the stock scones dfaire image or the single,
acceptable expression of the merged idea) that plaintiff must have copied to
prove that one or both of the two doctrines apply. Successfully raising this
affirmative defense would in effect prove that plaintiffs work was not
original and, thus, not deserving of copyright protection; that is the correct
interpretation of situations in which the merger and scones d faire doctrine
should apply. The current interpretation of the two part substantial
similarity test puts the burden on the plaintiff to establish both extrinsic
similarity and intrinsic similarity. Courts step in to interfere with this
process by asserting that the plaintiff s creation contains merged and scones
dfaire elements, doubling the burden of the plaintiff. To get to a jury, the
plaintiff must not only show factual, objective similarity but also stave off
the court's efforts to reduce her work to a dissembled pile of elements by
dissecting and filtering out alleged merged and scines d faire elements. If
the court's application of the merger and scones ai faire doctrine is broad
enough, the court will not be receptive to the argument that original and
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creative compilations of even unprotectable elements may enjoy copyright
protection and the court will prevent the work from being evaluated as a
whole by the finder of fact.
C. Recommendation: Allow the Finder of Fact to Evaluate the Total
Look and Feel of the Two Competing Visual Works, but Impose a
Check on the Process with Sspecial Verdict Forms
If the major premises of my argument are not accepted, and courts insist
that the merger and scones t faire doctrines apply to visual works, I have
one last suggestion: Allow the jury to evaluate the works as a whole, but
require the jury to identify through jury interrogatories or a special verdict
form the elements of the two works that are similar. Then, the court would
have an opportunity to intervene in a situation where the only items of
similarity identified by the jury are merged, scones di faire, or other public
domain features common to the two works and many others. In this way,
the jury is allowed to evaluate the two works as a whole, but the court has
built in a check and balance that can halt the jury's progress into
enforcement of a copyright through protection of unprotectable subject
matter. This method is contemplated by both the Ninth Circuit in Aliotti in
its recommendation that the court examine the findings of a "total concept
and feel" analysis to make sure the items of intrinsic similarity are not all
unprotected items,493 and by the Second Circuit in Boisson when the court's
model for a "more discerning observer" test would require well drafted jury
instructions to teach the jury to make a discerning comparison of the
competing works that is not based on similarities of unprotectable elements
of plaintiff s work.494
The merger and scones 6 faire doctrines have their place in copyright
law; their place is with literary works that depend on abstraction for a full
protection of the works' creative expression of the general ideas behind the
works. Visual works do not rely on levels of abstraction or on abstraction
at all. The vast majority of claims of infringement of visual works concern
literal or actual copying, not the borrowing of the abstract expressions of
the work.
In most cases, defendants will not be able to point to a preexisting
image (a stock scones i faire image, or the single image that merges with
the idea of the image) that was copied by the plaintiffs and that
...831 F.2d at 901.
494See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd. 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001).
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subsequently defendants did copy or might have copied in the production of
their own visual work. If such an image exists it should be raised as an
affirmative attack on the originality of the plaintiffs work. This would be
the logical justification for the application of the merger and scones t faire
doctrines to visual works. Instead, courts use the doctrines to chip away at
creative visual compositions and original combinations of original and
unoriginal elements until the work is reduced to a state where no one could
find that it was substantially similar to another work. That the merger and
scones d faire doctrines encompass visual images in the public domain that
visual artists are required to copy in order to depict or portray certain ideas
is a fallacy perpetrated by half of the circuits of the United States courts of
appeals. Only by recognizing the common creative practices of visual
artists and recognizing the full scope of protection that Feist affords to
original works and original combinations of unoriginal elements of visual
works can this fallacy be dispelled.
